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Abstract
Most traditional network measurement scans and attacks are carried out through the
use of direct, on-path network packet transmission. This requires that a machine be
on-path (i.e., involved in the packet transmission process) and as a result have direct
access to the data packets being transmitted. This limits network scans and attacks
to situations where access can be gained to an on-path machine. If, for example, a
researcher wanted to measure the round trip time between two machines they did
not have access to, traditional scans would be of little help as they require access to
an on-path machine to function. Instead the researcher would need to use an off-path
measurement scan.
Prior work using network side-channels to perform off-path measurements or attacks relied on techniques that either exhausted the shared, finite resource being used
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as a side-channel or only measured basic features such as connectivity. The work presented in this dissertation takes a different approach to using network side-channels.
I describe research that carries out network side-channel measurements that are more
complex than connectivity, such as packet round-trip-time or detecting active TCP
connections, and do not require a shared, finite resource be fully exhausted to cause
information to leak via a side-channel. My work is able to accomplish this by understanding the ways in which internal network stack state changes cause observable
behavior changes from the machine. The goal of this dissertation is to show that:
Information side-channels can be modulated to take advantage of dependent, network
state behavior to enable non-trivial, off-path measurements without fully exhausting
the shared, finite resources they use.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Network researchers have a large variety of tools at their disposal to measure onpath network characteristics and behaviors. On-path machines are involved in routing
packets between the two endpoints of a given network communication stream while
off-path machines are not involved in routing. These tools include programs such as
NMAP [2] which can scan for open ports, detect operating system type and version,
or identify the service running on a given port. However, these tools all rely on
information gathered from on-path scans and machines.
As an example consider NMAP’s port scanning measurement. This technique can
determine if a given port is listening for and accepting connections by sending SYN
packets directly to the target machine. This can be used to determine if the measurement machine can connect to a given port on another machine. However, it is
not possible for such a technique to determine if the same port can be accessed from
another arbitrary machine on the Internet. Such information is hidden from any
machines that are not on-path.
In addition to determining if a given remote machine can connect to another,
researchers may be interested in determining if such a connection currently exists
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between two machines. Again this information is readily available to on-path machines. They simply record any packets transmitted between the two machines and
check to see if they correspond to an active connection. Determining if such a connection exists between two off-path machines is much more difficult. Researchers cannot
capture off-path packets to check for an active connection. Using traditional on-path
measurement techniques the presence of off-path connections cannot be measured.
Now, consider two machines communicating over the Internet. Data transmissions between these two machines will take a given amount of time to travel from
one machine to the other and back again. This is referred to as the round trip time
(RTT) between the two machines. Normally this information is only available to
on-path machines involved in routing packets between the two end hosts. Off-Path
machines cannot measure the RTT because they cannot see the packets and cannot measure how long one round trip takes. To work around this researchers will
often attempt to use “nearby” machines as proxies when performing measurements.
“Nearby” machines refer to measurement machines in the same region, country, or
network as a desired target machine. These machines could be chosen from measurement networks such as PlanetLab [18], RIPE Atlas [69], or OONI [3]. However,
these networks rely on volunteers to install and maintain measurement nodes. This
results in cases where there are not any “nearby” machines to act as proxies, as the
network may not have machines installed in a given country, region, or network.
Each of the situations described above represent an area when on-path measurement techniques prove unable to provide researchers with the data they might want.
These limit the kinds of measurement scans researchers can perform and represent
a gap in our ability to study and measure the networks. While there has been some
prior work studying off-path techniques to address these limits via side-channel techniques, these require that researchers fully exhaust the shared, side-channel resources
on remote machines. Exhausting shared resources can cause an undesirable impact
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on these remote machines. The impact can range from a noticeable decrease in system performance up to a complete denial of service. For researchers seeking to carry
out responsible off-path measurements this resource exhaustion presents a major
problem. In this work I will develop new techniques for performing non-exhaustive
off-path measurements that will provide information not available via on-path measurements, with the need to fully exhaust shared resources on the remote machines
involved.

1.1

Dissertation Overview

In Chapter 2, I review previous work related to network measurement and network
side-channels. This includes work covering both on-path and off-path measurement
techniques, network side-channels, and Internet scale studies of common host behaviors.
Chapter 3 discusses my technique for measuring the round trip time (RTT) between arbitrary Internet hosts from an off-path measurement machine. This is a novel
technique that uses network side-channels present in the Linux kernel’s SYN-backlog
and is, to my knowledge, the first such work that does not require the use of an
additional “proxy” machine to measure round trip time. Instead my technique only
requires the use of three machines, those whose round trip time is being measured
and the machine carrying out the off-path measurements.
Chapter 4 presents a novel technique for off-path detection of active TCP connections using novel side-channels present in the Linux kernel’s handling of the IPv4
identification field (IPID) for outgoing TCP packets. This technique exploits the
kernel’s use of 2048 global IPID counters for packets sent outside established TCP
connections and per-connection counters for packets sent inside established TCP connections. By measuring changes to the IPID field as a result of measurement probes
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an off-path machine can detect when the Linux kernel changes from using a global
counter to a per-connection counter and thereby detect the presence of an active
TCP connection.
Chapter 5 details an Internet scale study of IPv4 IPID generation algorithms
and the potential side-channels they may contain. This study is the first that I am
aware of to study the entire IPv4 address space, without making any assumptions
about the number and specific behaviors of IPID generation algorithms used. In
addition to studying the IPID generation algorithms used across the entire Internet,
this chapter also details my attempts to determine if shared information flows exist
for each different algorithm I identify. This study is a first step in attempting to
automate part of the process of locating potential network stack side-channels, which
normally requires time consuming manual analysis and reverse engineering.
In Chapter 6 I outline potential directions for future research and investigation.
In Chapter 7 I summarize my findings and provide my concluding remarks.
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Related Work
Network side-channels for network measurement or network attacks is an area of
research that has seen less focus than other types of network security or scanning.
In addition, many of the side-channel techniques discussed below fully exhaust the
given resource they are using as a side-channel or are only concerned with simple
connectivity measurements. Techniques that do not fully exhaust shared resources,
or measure features beyond simple connectivity, constitute a relatively unstudied
area of research and are the focus of the work in this dissertation.
One of the first uses of network side-channels as a measurement technique was the
original Idle Scan proposed by Antirez [6] to scan for open ports on a target machine.
Ensafi et al. [29] proposed another side-channel using the SYN-backlog for the same
purpose. Subsequent work by Ensafi et al. [28] used this side-channel to provide
a technique for measuring intentional blocking of ports by firewalls. Morbitzer [58]
proposed a technique for an IPv6 Idle Scan. Zhang et al. used side-channels to detect
machines hidden behind firewalls [82] and describe ONIS [83] for port scanning. Chen
et al. [16] showed how the IPID field could be used as a side-channel to measure a
multitude of information about a server including amount of internal traffic generated
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and the number of machines used for load-balancing. Bellovin describes a technique
for counting the number of hosts behind a NAT [9] and Kohno et al. [47] made use of
IPIDs to fingerprint remote devices. All of these works focus on studying connectivity
measures (e.g., whether packets are being blocked between two machines or whether
a machine is responding to packets on a given port) or measures that are not tied to
client machine state changes (e.g., counting the number of machines or the number
of packets sent via IPID changes).
Knockel and Crandall [45] discuss a technique for inferring the presence of active
IPv4 connections on Linux machines using the IPID field and IP fragmentation
reassembly behavior. Qian and Mao [66,67] use firewall based network side-channels
to infer TCP sequence numbers and perform off-path TCP/IP connection hijacking.
Cao et al. [13, 14] use the Linux kernel’s initial, unpatched challenge ACK behavior to
implement an off-path TCP reset attack and a connection hijacking attack. Quach
et al. [68] later scanned the Internet to discover how quickly popular web servers
patched the vulnerability discovered by Cao et al.. Chen and Qian [17] describe
a side-channel present in the IEEE 802.11 protocol that allows for off-path TCP
injection attacks. In comparison to my own work, many of the above side-channel
techniques require the use of malicious code running on the victim machine or fully
exhaust shared, global resources (e.g., global packet rate limits or shared memory
buffers such as the fragmentation cache).
IPIDs and IP fragmentation have been used as side-channels in many of the
techniques described by Gilad and Herzberg. They explored the use of global IPID
counters, fake congestion events, and packet processing delays as side-channels to
infer the presence of traffic between hosts on the Tor network [33]. They also explored
the use of IP fragmentation to perform off-path interception and denial-of-service
attacks on machines behind a NAT or network tunnel [35]. A part of their attack
involves inferring the Linux per-destination IPID counter. This technique requires
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the use of an agent running on either the client machine or another machine behind
the NAT or tunnel running attacker code. The attack I describe does not require
the use of an agent and can be done remotely and completely off-path. Gilad and
Herzberg additionally discussed attacks which combined puppets and TCP/IP sidechannels to attack the Same Origin Policy and carry out TCP injections [34].
Recently non-network side-channels have become an active area of security research. The most common of these side-channel attacks take advantage of timing
side-channels in both software and hardware. The Spectre [46] and Meltdown [52]
attacks disclosed in 2018 take advantage of timing side-channels to enable an attacker
to read private data the attacker would otherwise be unable to access. Prior work
to Spectre and Meltdown showed that timing side-channels could be used to build a
wide-range of attacks. Song et al. [71] showed that keypress timings could be used as a
side-channel to attack SSH implementations. Later work showed that timing attacks
existed in a range of CPU caches and special purpose instructions [10,11,36,53,63,80].
Many of these side-channels were used to attack specific implementations of cryptographic algorithms and leak the key or other secret values. Compared with my
work they commonly target side-channels present in computer hardware and not the
software implementing the network stack.
Covert channels and covert channel analysis represent an area of research related
to side-channels. A covert channel is a source of information transfer between processes which are not intended to communicate with each other, according to some
security policy. While side-channels leak information about system state, and do
not require collusion between actors, covert channels instead leak information about
system objects (e.g., privileged files or databases) and require that the actors involved collude in order to leak the chosen information. An overview of the design
of systematic covert system channel analysis [48, 51] can be found in the “light pink
book” [50]. The goal of covert channel analysis is to design a general, systematic
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approach to identifing all possible covert channels within a computer system. Kemmerer [43] developed a technique to enumerate all covert channels in a system using
a transitive closure between processes in a system and their ability to read/write
objects. This work provided a general technique for enumerating covert channels
in a system. However, it requires that all objects within a system be known. This
presents difficulties as covert channels can often use variables that may not be viewed
as objects. Wray [79] described a technique for enumerating covert channels when
timing and clocks are considered.
Recent work [13, 28, 29, 35, 45] on finding and using network side-channels has
focused on considering shared, limited resources in isolation. The work in this dissertation shows that, like covert channels, attempts to enumerate side-channels in
system networking stacks must consider sets of behaviors that go beyond exhausting
individual shared, limited resources.
My techniques make use of spoofed, also referred to as forged, source IP addresses.
Reverse traceroute [42] utilizes spoofed source IP addresses to perform a reverse
traceroute. That is, instead of the path to an end host, the return path from an end
host is traced. PoiRoot [40] uses spoofed IP addresses to investigate Interdomain
Path changes, while Flach et al. [30] use spoofed IP addresses to locate DestinationBased Forwarding rule violations. Many of the side-channel techniques discussed
previously also use spoofed IP addresses [28, 29, 67, 81, 82].
Previous work to measure off-path round trip times has often involved access to
multiple vantage points to act as one end host. IDMaps [31] takes this approach.
iPlane [54] uses multiple vantage points to measure round trip times, along with
packet loss and other useful network performance metrics. De A. Rocha et al. [7]
present a technique for estimating delay and variance using forged return IP addresses. Cangialosi et al. [12] describe Ting for measuring latencies between arbitrary
Tor nodes. King [37] and Queen [77] estimate off-path round trip time and off-path
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packet loss rate by using recursive DNS queries to DNS servers topologically near
each end point. Due to this King, like my technique, does not require the use of
multiple vantage points or direct access to either end host. In contrast my work does
not require the use of additional machines, such as King’s DNS servers, or protocols
beyond TCP. Zhang et al. [81] discussed a technique for off-path RTT measurement,
based on my own work described in Chapter 3. Their work references my own work
and uses a more active form of probing compared to my technique that relies on the
presence of a mathematical model of SYN-backlog behavior to improve RTT estimate
accuracy.
Another approach for estimating round trip times is to provide a coordinate
system in which end hosts can be placed. Once a host has been given a set of
coordinates, round trip time estimates can be made based on the distance between
two end hosts, based on their coordinates. Vivaldi [21] and GNP [59] use such
coordinate systems. Hariri et al. [38] develop a distributed latency estimation system
using a coordinate based approach while Zheng et al. [84] explore how routing policies
on the Internet can affect the accuracy of such coordinate systems.
Network Tomography [15, 19, 76] is a method for inferring large-scale characteristics about the internal structure of a network using probes sent from edge hosts,
on the outer edge of the network. Previous work by Tsang et al. [75] has shown that
tomography can be used to measure network delay.
My work described in Chapter 5 includes an Internet scale “mass-scan” to study
IPID field behavior to find potential operating systems that could contain IPID-based
side-channels. Internet scale scanning is a recent area of study. The most widely
known Internet scale scanning tool is ZMap [26], a tool capable of scanning for open
ports over the entire IPv4 address space in approximately 45 minutes. Other massscanning tools include scanrand [41], masscan [1], unicornscan [49], and Shodan [57].
Gasser et al. [32] extended ZMap to support IPv6 addresses and developed tech-
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niques to efficiently scan the IPv6 Internet. Much like my own work, discussed in
Chapter 5, these tools use a combination of asynchronous packet transmission and
stateless scanning techniques to achieve the transmission speeds necessary to scan
large networks in practical timespans.
While Internet scale mass scans taking place over minutes or hours, instead of
days, are a relatively recent development large scale Internet studies have been previously carried out using slower tools. One of the first such studies was carried
out by Paxson [61]. Paxson studied network behaviors and features by performing
bi-directional network traces (i.e., Paxson traced and recorded network connections
from host A to host B and host B to host A). Weaver et al. [78] carried out another
large scale study on the presence and behavior of injected TCP RST packets. Their
data contained over 30 million TCP flows gathered via passive network measurement. Heninger et al. [39] studied inadequate randomness in TLS certificates and
SSH keys. Dainotti et al. [22] used passive measurements to study the IPv4 address
space usage. Most recently Salutari et al. [70] studied IPID behavior in the IPv4
Internet. Their work focused on studying IPID behavior based on the four most
widely referenced IPID algorithms (i.e., constant values, per-host counters, global
counters, and random counters). In addition their work only scanned a portion of
the entire IPv4 addresses space, one machine from each /24 CIDR subnet. My own
work in this area, discussed in Chapter 5 makes no assumptions as to the number
of different IPID behaviors and is more focused on which behaviors may contain
side-channels rather than an overall study of general behavior, and was conducted
by sending packets to all routable IPv4 addresses.
The work presented in this dissertation adds to the body of previous work on
network side-channels. Specifically, my work focuses on techniques for measuring
network features beyond simple connectivity at the IP layer without fully exhausting
the shared, finite resources used as side-channels.

10

Chapter 3
Off-Path Round Trip Time
Measurement
Round trip time measurements represent a fundamental network metric that can be
used in a wide range of applications, such as: determining the fastest route, closest
server, and some forms of IP geolocation. While direct measurement of round trip
time is a simple task, it can only provide information about round trip times to a
single end host along a single route. This places limitations on the extent to which
large scale measurements can be performed, as it requires access to a large number
of well distributed end hosts to provide sufficient network coverage.
In delay based IP geolocation techniques, such as those described by Gueye et
al. [37] and GeoPing [60] , the round trip time is often used as a proxy for geographic
distance. By measuring the round trip time between the target machine and a series
of “landmark” machines whose geographic positions are known, it is possible to provide an estimate of the target machine’s geographic location. Usually these systems
require access to the “landmark” servers to perform round trip time measurements,
which limits their ability to choose a sufficient number of appropriate “landmarks”
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to allow for accurate geolocation for all possible end hosts.
In this chapter, I introduce a novel technique for off-path round trip time estimation, based on the use of information side-channels in the modern Linux TCP/IP
network stack, to infer the round trip time between two arbitrary end hosts. My
technique requires the use of no machines beyond the measurement machine and
the chosen end hosts and does not require the use of any protocols beyond standard
TCP. The only requirements are that one end host be a Linux machine, running
a kernel of version 2.6 or higher, with an open port, and that the second end host
respond to unsolicited SYN-ACK packets with RST packets.
When clients want to connect to a server over TCP they first use a three-way
handshake to initialize the connection. Any connections that have yet to complete
this three-way handshake are referred to as “half-open” connections. Information
related to these “half-open” connections are stored in a shared, finite data structure
known as the SYN-backlog. Modern network stacks only store such connections for a
limited amount of time, to avoid these entries exhausting the finite resources used to
store these connections. Once this time limit has passed, these “half-open” connections are removed from the SYN-backlog to make space for new connection attempts.
By manipulating the number of “half-open” connections in a given SYN-backlog, it
is possible to use the behavior of the SYN-backlog to infer useful information about
connections present in the backlog, including round trip time. When the state of the
SYN-backlog changes the behavior of a Linux kernel’s network stack changes. Instead
of storing all “half-open” connections, the kernel will remove older entries to avoid
complete resource exhaustion. My technique can detect this behavior change, use it
to infer the state of the SYN-backlog and from there the round trip time of off-path
routes without fully exhausting the SYN-backlog.
The contributions of this chapter are as follows:
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• I describe a method for using information side-channels in the Linux TCP/IP
network stack to infer the round trip time of off-path routes.
• I design and implement a measurement technique for using these side-channels
to measure off-path round trip times between arbitrary Internet end hosts.
• I provide a detailed analysis and evaluation of the technique’s accuracy across
a range of routes and round trip time values. I discuss possible sources of error
and how these can impact the accuracy of my measurements.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: In Section 3.1 I provide a brief
overview of the behavior of the SYN-backlog in modern Linux kernels and discuss
how this behavior leaks information that can be used to perform useful network
measurements. In Section 3.2, I describe my technique for inferring off-path round
trip time in depth. I then describe my experimental setup in Section 3.3 and discuss
my results in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 addresses some ethical concerns and is followed
by my conclusion in Section 3.6.

3.1

Background

Standard TCP connections are established via a “three-way handshake” as defined
in RFC 793 [64]. This process consists of a total of three TCP packets being sent
between each end point of a connection, in order to establish all the necessary state
required for a TCP connection to be established. In the first step the client sends
a TCP SYN packet to the server. Assuming the server is accepting connections, it
responds with a TCP SYN-ACK packet. The client responds with a TCP ACK packet
and can begin sending data.
Connections which have not completed the “three-way handshake” are stored in
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a data structure called the SYN-backlog. Connections stored in the backlog are considered to be “half-open” connections. The SYN-backlog plays an important role in
ensuring the establishment of TCP connections. Until the “three-way handshake” is
complete the TCP connection has not been fully initiated and data can not be sent
between hosts. To ensure that “half-open” connections can be completed, various
information about the connection must be stored, so that the “three-way handshake”
can be successfully completed. This information is stored in the SYN-backlog. The
SYN-backlog also provides a protection mechanism against packet loss during a TCP
connection setup. If either the SYN-ACK or the ACK in the handshake is lost or
dropped, then the presence of a SYN packet in the SYN-backlog allows for the retransmission of the SYN-ACK, in an attempt to allow the connection to be completed.
However, if the SYN packet is allowed to remain in the SYN-backlog indefinitely,
then system resources will be exhausted storing connection information that may
never be used. In order to prevent these “half-open” connections from fully exhausting available system resources, most modern network stacks only store “half-open”
connections for a limited amount of time before they are removed from the SYNbacklog. In addition to storing these connections, network stacks will often resend
SYN-ACK packets for which no ACK has been received. The number of retransmissions
and the length of time for which a “half-open” connection remains in the SYN-backlog
varies across TCP implementations.
My technique focuses on the SYN-backlog implementation used in Linux kernels of
version 2.6 and higher. The kernel maintains a SYN-backlog, for each listening socket,
whose length is chosen when the socket starts listening for new connection attempts.
The kernel maintains a threshold for the number of retransmission attempts that
will be made for each SYN-ACK that has not received an ACK packet as a response.
This threshold is set to five as a default value. The Linux kernel distinguishes
between “young” connections (i.e., connections for which there have been no SYN14
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ACK retransmissions) and “mature” connections, for which at least one retransmission
has been sent.
The kernel attempts to ensure that at least half of the SYN-backlog is available
for “young” connections. If the SYN-backlog is at least half full then the kernel
will attempt to remove “mature” connections, based on the number of retransmission attempts that have been sent, until the SYN-backlog’s current size drops below
half capacity. When attempting to remove “mature” connections the kernel will
temporarily compute a new threshold value, depending on the number of “young”
attempts present in the SYN-backlog. The more “young” connections that are present
the larger this threshold value will be. Any “mature” connections that have sent a
total number of retransmissions greater than this threshold will be removed, until at
least half of the SYN-backlog is free for new connection attempts.
The behavior of removing “mature” connections that have not yet retransmitted
the full five times provides an information side-channel that allows SYN-backlog information state to be leaked. If a “half-open” connection does not elicit the full five
retransmission attempts, then I know the SYN-backlog was filled beyond half, leaking
information about the state of the SYN-backlog. Note that causing and detecting
state changes in the SYN-backlog does not require that I fully fill the SYN-backlog
and exhaust this shared, finite resource. In order to cause the desired state change,
the SYN-backlog only needs to be filled to half capacity, avoiding complete resource
exhaustion.

3.2

Implementation

I designed my system based on two observations about the behavior of the SYNbacklog in the Linux kernel and how this behavior changes when the SYN-backlog
state changes. The first observation is that the ratio of “young” connections to
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“mature” connections can be influenced by an off-path host. If a host sends a large
amount of SYN packets, each using different sequence numbers and source ports,
these will each be stored as separate SYN-backlog entries. By never completing the
TCP three-way handshake (i.e: never sending an ACK in response to any SYN-ACKs),
it is possible to ensure that after a few seconds the SYN-backlog will contain mostly
“mature” entries. If enough entries are sent then the SYN-backlog will be filled beyond
the halfway mark with “mature” entries, causing the kernel to remove entries which
have been retransmitted too many times. This is done in order to ensure there is
sufficient space in the SYN-backlog for newer “young” entries.
The second observation is that it is possible to influence the threshold value for
which connection attempts are removed by the SYN-backlog when more than half the
SYN-backlog is taken up by “mature” connections. Since the kernel determines this
value based on the number of “young” connections, a SYN-backlog that has mostly
“mature” connections and very few “young” connections will use a low threshold value
when determining which connections to remove from the SYN-backlog. By filling the
SYN-backlog with “half-open” connections and waiting until all these connections
have received a number of retransmissions greater than the threshold, I can ensure
that some of these connections will be removed if the SYN-backlog is then filled past
the half way point.
As previously mentioned there are a few requirements that must be met in order
for the measurements to be performed. First, one of the end hosts, referred to as the
“Server” in the chapter, must be running a modern Linux kernel and have an open
TCP port. Second, the other end host, referred to as the “Client”, must respond
to unsolicited SYN-ACK packets with a RST packet. Round trip time measurements
can then be carried out by an off-path machine, referred to as the “Measurement
Machine”.
Overall my technique consists of a binary search over a range of possible round
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Figure 3.1: Three stages of my scan. Stage 1 partially fills the SYN-backlog of the
Server with SYN packets from the Measurement Machine. Stage 2 sends SYN to the
Server which appear to come from the Client. These trigger SYN-ACKs which are
then reset. In Stage 3 the number of retransmissions for each SYN sent in Stage 1 is
tallied and a determination is made about the chosen RTT estimate.

trip time values. Each round of the binary search consists of three stages, shown in
Figure 3.1. These stages:

• Establish the necessary conditions for use of the information side-channel.
• Attempt to cause a change in the state of the SYN-backlog
• Infer whether or not the desired state change occurred.

Depending on whether or not the desired state change occurred, I can then determine how to adjust the upper and lower bounds used for the next iteration in the
binary search.
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3.2.1

Determining Scan Parameters

Before the round trip time between two hosts can be measured some parameters
about the Server must be determined. These parameters are the size of the Server
machine’s SYN-backlog and the total amount of time taken for the Server to send all
five SYN-ACK retransmissions to received SYN packets.

Determining Server SYN-backlog Size
To determine the Server’s SYN-backlog size a technique similar to the full scan described below can be used. The Linux kernel places a minimum threshold on the
size of the SYN-backlog of eight. Based on this, an attempt to determine the backlog size can proceed as follows: First, I set the estimated SYN-backlog size to eight
and then send half the estimated size minus one unique SYN packets to the Server.
Second, wait until two retransmissions have been seen for each SYN packet and then
send two more unique SYN packets to the Server. Third, see if any of the first round
of SYN packets do not retransmit SYN-ACKs. If all SYN packets continue to receive
SYN-ACKs then the estimated SYN-backlog size is too small, otherwise it is too big.
If the estimate is too small, double the estimate and repeat the previous steps. If
the estimate is too large, carry out a binary search using the estimate as an upper
bound and half the estimate as the lower bound.

Determining Server Retransmission Timing
Measuring the amount of time taken by the Server to send all five SYN-ACK retransmissions is a simple process. The Measurement Machine sends a SYN packet to the
Server and then waits until it sees five retransmissions of the SYN-ACK sent in response to the initial SYN packet. In determining how long to wait between each
18
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retransmission attempt, the Linux kernel normally waits twice the amount of time it
waited on the previous retransmission. As an example, if the kernel waits one second
before sending a retransmission, it will wait two seconds after sending the first before
sending then second, then four, eight and so on until five retransmission have been
sent. After five retransmissions have been sent, the kernel waits for another retransmission interval before removing the initial SYN packet from the SYN-backlog. Given
this behavior, once the fifth retransmission is seen the amount of time between the
first SYN-ACK’s arrival and the fifth retransmission provides the Server retransmission
timing.

3.2.2

Scanning the Target Machine

Before starting each binary search iteration, a new round trip time estimate (eRT T )
is chosen as the midpoint between an upper and lower bound determined for the
actual RT T . Each iteration will attempt to determine if the actual RT T is greater
than, or less than the chosen estimate. In practice I use 0.0 as a starting lower bound
and the time interval between the first SYN-ACK retransmission as the upper bound.
For most Linux systems this time interval is one second by default. However, to
measure longer round trip times a larger upper bound would be chosen.
In the first stage of my technique, the Measurement Machine sends

n
2

− 7 SYN

packets to the Server to partially fill the SYN-backlog, where n is the size of the SYNbacklog for the open socket on the Server. This amount of SYN packets was chosen to
ensure that I do not fill the SYN-backlog beyond halfway, which would fully exhaust
this shared, finite resource, and to provide a small amount of padding space to allow
other connection attempts that are not a part of the measurement to be completed
without impacting my measurements. The Measurement Machine is programmed
not to respond to any SYN-ACKs sent in response to these SYNs, which causes each
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of these SYNs to be treated as “half-open” connections by the Server. Each SYN
uses a different sequence number and source port to ensure they are each treated
as new, unique connection attempts. The Measurement Machine then waits until it
has received two retransmission attempts from each SYN packet, before moving on to
Stage 2.
In Stage 2, the Measurement Machine sends

6
eRT T

SYN packets per second to the

Server for ten seconds. eRT T is measured in seconds. Each of these packets uses a
spoofed source IP address to appear as if sent from the Client. All spoofed packets
also use different sequence numbers and ports so that they are all treated as separate
connection attempts. Each of the SYNs will cause the Server to send a SYN-ACK to
the Client. Once the Client receives these SYN-ACKs it will determine that it sent no
accompanying SYN packet and respond with a RST packet. Once these RST packets
arrive at the Server they will cause the corresponding SYN packets to be removed
from the SYN-backlog. After the Measurement Machine has finished sending at the
determined rate for ten seconds the process moves on to the third stage.
In Stage 3, the Measurement Machine waits and records the number of SYN-ACK
retransmissions it received for each of the SYN packets that were sent in Stage 1.
Modern Linux kernel s will make five retransmission attempts for each “half-open”
connection before removing a SYN packet from the SYN-backlog. For the default
kernel configuration, these attempts will occur at 1, 2, 4, 8, and 16 second intervals
after the previous SYN-ACK was sent, with the packet being removed from the SYNbacklog 32 seconds after the fifth SYN-ACK is sent. That is after the first SYN-ACK
is sent the Server waits one second and if no ACK has been received the SYN-ACK
is retransmitted. If after 2 seconds no ACK has been received another SYN-ACK is
retransmitted and so on, until 5 retransmissions have been sent. I have also seen
these 5 retransmission attempts being sent at 3, 6, 12, 24, and 48 second intervals
after the previous SYN-ACK, with the kernel waiting 96 seconds after the fifth and
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final retransmission before the SYN is removed from the SYN-backlog. The exact
timing of a given machine can be determined before any measurement attempt by
sending a single SYN and determining the interval between subsequent retransmission
attempts.
After Stage 3, it is possible to determine if the chosen round trip time estimate
is greater than or less than the actual round trip time between the two end hosts.
If the chosen estimate is less than the actual round trip time, then the sent packets
will begin to accumulate in the SYN-backlog, as new packets will arrive before previous packets are removed due to the Client sending RST packets in response to the
Server’s SYN-ACK packets. This will cause the SYN-backlog’s size to exceed half of
its maximum capacity. This causes the kernel to remove “mature” entries until the
SYN-backlog size is below half the maximum capacity. Any entries that are removed
will stop retransmitting SYN-ACKs. If the estimated round trip time is greater than
the actual round trip time, each packet will be reset before the next arrives and the
SYN-backlog will never contain enough packets to cause the kernel to try and remove
any “mature” connection attempts. Using this information I can continue my binary
search, adjusting my round trip time estimate accordingly. My technique then continues iterating over possible ranges of round trip times until the scan has provided
an accurate bound on the round trip time.

3.2.3

An Example Iteration

Consider an off-path measurement being performed between a Server, S, and a Client,
C, by a Measurement Machine, M . Assume that the open socket on S has a SYNbacklog size of 256. The route between S and C has an actual round trip time of
60ms and previous iterations of the binary search have determined that the next
estimate should be in between 50ms and 100ms. First, a new estimate is determined
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to be 75ms, the midpoint between 50 and 100. In Stage 1 M sends

256
2

− 7 = 121 SYN

packets to S and does not respond to any synacks sent in response. After receiving
two retransmission attempts per SYN packet Stage 2 begins.
M then sends

6
0.075

= 80 SYN packets per second for ten seconds to S with the

spoofed source IP address of C, since the midpoint time is 75ms. S will respond to
each SYN by sending SYN-ACKs to C. Since C did not send any SYN packets it responds
to these SYN-ACKs with RST packets. Once these RSTs arrive at S the corresponding
SYN packets are removed from the SYN-backlog. Based on my previous choice of
packet rate, S receives six SYN packets for every estimated round trip time between
itself and C. However, because the chosen estimate, 75ms, is greater than the actual
round trip time of 60ms each SYN in this group of six will have already been removed
before the next group of six arrive. Because of this the SYN-backlog will never fill
beyond 127, which is less than the value required to remove “mature” connections
from the SYN-backlog.
Finally, in Stage 3, M will receive 5 retransmissions for each SYN that was sent in
Stage 1 since the removal behavior was never triggered. M will then conclude that
the chosen estimate 75ms is too large and determine the bounds for the next binary
search iteration to be a lower bound of 50ms and an upper bound of 75ms.

3.3

Experimental Setup

To test the effectiveness of my technique I compared my technique with actual round
trip time measurements between end hosts on the Internet. I used a set of 15 PlanetLab [18] nodes: 3 from each of North America, South America, Europe, Asia, and
Australia/New Zealand, as the Server end host. This group was chosen to provide
a distributed set of Server hosts, on most continents. Each PlanetLab node runs a
simple server program which creates an open port, for use by my scan, with a backlog
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size of 256. Each PlanetLab node was running a Linux kernel of either version 2.6.X
or 2.7.X, which met my requirements for the Server end host.
These PlanetLab nodes did not provide any additional assistance to my Measurement Machine during any part of my experiment. These nodes only provided an
open port, provided access to ground-truth round trip time measurements to compare my estimates to, and performed occasional traceroutes to provide information
about any potential routing changes that may have influenced my results. As a result
all my round trip time measurements were performed off-path, from the Measurement Machine’s point of view. Actual round trip time values for each measurement
were gathered from direct packet captures of the off-path scan being performed. In
other words, the exact same SYN-ACK packets and RST responses between
the Server and Client were used for both direct and indirect measurements, so that any error in my indirect measurements can be attributed
to my technique and not other factors. This provided me with the actual round
trip time that each off-path scan was measuring. Note, that when I say I measured
the round-trip time, what I measured is the average round trip time over the entire
length of the experiment. So my ground truth is based on this average.
The Measurement Machine was a machine running Ubuntu Linux 12.04 LTS with
Linux kernel version 3.5.0 with a direct connection to the local Internet backbone to
avoid any local filtering or firewalls.
Client end hosts were chosen by IP address, at random, from the entire publicly
routable IPv4 address space. For each randomly chosen Client IP address, the Measurement Machine checked to see if the host met my requirements for a Client end
host, that is that the host responded to unsolicited SYN-ACKs with a RST packet.
During my experiments I noted that some machines respond with packets that had
only the RST flag set while others responded with both the RST and ACK flags set.
Both of these packets resulted in the desired Server SYN-backlog behavior and Client
23

Chapter 3. Off-Path Round Trip Time Measurement
machines using either were used.
Once a Client IP address was found that met my requirements, an available
PlanetLab node from my set of 15 was chosen at random to act as the Server end
host for my technique. The Measurement machine then carried out my round trip
time measurement technique, using the two chosen end hosts. During the scan, the
chosen PlanetLab node captured all traffic being sent to the open port it had created
and ran periodic TCP traceroutes, to record any route changes that occurred during
the course of the scan. The Measurement Machine also captured all traffic between
itself and the Server. Each measurement scan took between five and ten minutes to
complete. During my measurements the Measurement Machine made no contact with
any Client machines, beyond checking to ensure that they met my requirements.

3.4

Analysis

To evaluate the accuracy of my technique I collected data over a two week period,
from July 14, 2014 through July 28, 2014. During this time span I collected 616
round trip time estimates. Each scan measured both the actual round trip time
and the round trip time determined by my off-path technique, as measured by the
Measurement Machine. Figure 3.2 shows a CDF plot of the ratio between the actual
round trip time, R, and the off-path estimate, E, E/R.
If my measurements were perfect then the ratio E/R would be 1.0 for each
measurement estimate. Any ratio that is less than 1.0 indicates an underestimated
round trip time, a ratio greater than 1.0 indicates an overestimated round trip time.
Overall, I found that approximately 60% of the round trip times measured in my
dataset resulted in ratios of 1.0 or lower, providing a lower bound on the round trip
time in these cases. Over 60% of scans in my dataset were within 10% of the actual
round trip time measured, with over 80% of my off-path measurements falling within
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Figure 3.2: Accuracy of round trip time estimates.

20% of their actual round trip times. Table 3.1 summarizes my results.

3.4.1

Effect of Packet Loss

One prominent source of error that affects the accuracy of my technique is packet loss
between the Server and Client. In cases where there is noticeable packet loss, which I
define as greater than 5%, between the Server and the Client, my measurements often
differ from the actual round trip time by 25% or more. These large error values are
the result of packet loss which impacts the accuracy of my off-path measurements.
Consider the case where a SYN-ACK sent from the Server to the Client as a result
of a spoofed SYN is lost. In this case the Client will never send a RST packet and
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RTT Range

Within 10%

Within 20%

Packet Loss

No Packet Loss

Packet Loss

No Packet Loss

[25ms, ∞)
[100ms, ∞)
[0ms, 25ms]
[0ms, 100ms]
[25ms, 100ms]

63.6%
67.1%
18.0%
35.5%
43.5%

72.1%
75.9%
16.0%
39.3%
49.3%

83.7%
87.2%
46.1%
58.06%
63.5%

92.7%
96.0%
60.0%
69.05%
72.9%

Overall

60.7%

68.87%

81.33%

90.84%

Table 3.1: Percent of measurements within a given percent of actual round trip time.

the spoofed SYN will remain the Server’s SYN-backlog longer than was expected. If
enough SYN-ACKs are lost in transit the SYN-backlog will fill beyond halfway, causing
the kernel to evict “half-open” connections as previously described. My technique
measures this eviction as an indication that the current round trip time estimate is
too high resulting in an incorrect measurement. A similar situation occurs if the RST
sent by the Client in response to a SYN-ACK sent by the Server is lost.

Figure 3.3 compares my overall estimates with those that had no packet loss. For
measurements with a packet loss rate of 5% or less, a lower bound is provided for
64% of paths. Over 65% of measurements are within 10% of the actual round trip
time, while over 85% are within 20%. When considering only those measurements
with no packet loss, a lower bound is found in over 65% of measurements. Over 68%
of estimates are within 10% of the actual round trip time and over 90% are within
20%. Compared to King [37] which measures round trip times to within 10% error for
roughly two-thirds of chosen routes and upwards of three-quarters of routes within
20% error, my technique provides similar accuracy with packet loss and improved
accuracy without packet loss.
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Figure 3.3: Effect of packet loss on measurement accuracy.

3.4.2

Accuracy when Actual Round Trip Time is Small

To further explore the accuracy of my measurements, I considered situations in which
specific network characteristics are present. In cases where the round trip time I
attempt to measure is small I found that my technique performed quite poorly. I
considered actual round trip times of 25ms or less as small. When I considered routes
with actual round trip times less than 25ms, my estimate represents a lower bound in
43.6% of cases. Only 18% are within 10% of the actual round trip time and 46.1% are
within 20%. As I previously discussed, high packet loss rates can have a significant
impact on the accuracy of my measurements. When considering small round trip
time routes with no packet loss, a lower bound is found in 52% of measurements,
with 16% and 60% falling within 10 and 20 percent of the actual round trip time as
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Figure 3.4: Accuracy of round trip time estimates with actual RTT less than 25ms.

shown in Figure 3.4.
I next considered my accuracy when excluding low round trip time routes. For
all routes with round trip times greater than 25ms a lower bound is found for 60.83%
of routes, with 63.6% being measured within 10% of the actual round trip time, and
83.7% measured within 20%. Figure 3.5 shows these results. Excluding routes that
experienced any packet loss, 70.6% of measurement provided a lower bound, 72.1%
were within 10% of the actual round trip time, and 92.7% were within 20%.
One possible explanation for this drop in accuracy is that, as the round trip time
I measured gets smaller, the impact that small variations in the round trip time
have on my measurements are magnified. When dealing with round trip times below
25ms, a difference of a few milliseconds can affect the rate at which my technique fills
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Figure 3.5: Accuracy of round trip time estimates with actual RTT greater than
25ms.

the SYN-backlog. If the backlog fills faster than expected as a result of these variances
this could cause packets to be removed when they should not be. This unexpected
change in SYN-backlog behavior would cause incorrect binary search decisions, which
results in the inaccuracy of my measurements for small round trip times.

3.4.3

Accuracy on Routes with Large Round Trip Times

Next, I considered the accuracy of my measurements on routes that have a large
round trip time. I define a large round trip time to be greater than 100ms. For such
routes 63.2% are lower bounded, 67.1% are within 10% of the actual round trip time,
and 87.2% are within 20% of the actual round trip time. On routes that experience
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Figure 3.6: Accuracy of round trip time estimates with actual RTT less than 100ms.

no packet loss, my measurement technique determined an accurate lower bound for
73.6% of measurements and estimate the round trip time within 10% for 75.9% of
routes and within 20% on 96% of routes. Figure 3.6 compares measurements of
routes with round trip times less than 100ms, with and without packet loss, and
Figure 3.7 compares routes with round trip times greater than 100ms. Figures 3.8
and 3.9 compare my overall results across various round trip times, with and without
packet loss.
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Figure 3.7: Accuracy of round trip time estimates with actual RTT greater than
100ms.

3.4.4

Effect of Large RTT Variations

Another source of error is the impact that variations in the round trip time between
the chosen hosts have on the accuracy of my measurements. Consider a route between
two hosts, where the round trip time varies between a high of 400ms and a low of
200ms. In one iteration of the binary search the round trip time is measured as
200ms and I adjust my bounds accordingly. However, during the next iteration the
round trip time jumps to 400ms. This new value is then measured and the bounds
are adjusted. If the round trip time then drops near 200ms for the next iteration
I will have incorrectly adjusted my bounds closer to 400ms, when they should be
closer to 200ms. In some cases, depending on the chosen bounds, such an error could
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Figure 3.8: Comparison between overall dataset, lower RTT only, and high RTT
only.

result in the actual round trip time no longer being within these new bounds, making
accurate measurement impossible.

3.4.5

Effect of Route Changes

The final source of error I noted was changes to the route between the chosen end
hosts. While minor changes to the route often had little impact on my final accuracy,
in a few cases new routes resulted in different overall round trip times. If these
differences in round trip time are large enough then some packets may arrive sooner
or later than anticipated. If packets arrive too soon the SYN-backlog will not fill up
and evict “mature” SYNs in cases where it should. However, if packets arrive too
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Figure 3.9: Comparison between overall dataset, lower RTT only, and high RTT
only with no packet loss.

late then the backlog will fill in cases where it should not and cause packets to be
evicted. Both cases can result in inaccurate measurements.

3.5

Ethical Considerations

When performing network measurement scans there are potential ethical issues that
each scan must address and my scan is no exception. Every packet sent by a scan
consumes resources for each scanned machine. These resources include network bandwidth, CPU cycles dealing with incoming packets, and time spent by system administrators determining if packets are a threat to the network. For my scan there are
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a few possible ethical issues that should be discussed and addressed.
The first is the use of the SYN-backlog as a side-channel. As part of my measurements I need to fill the SYN-backlog of the Server machine at least half full with SYN
packets, whose connections will never be completed. This creates a drain of resources
on the Server by causing the creation of “half-open” TCP connections for the duration of the scan. If my scan were to fill the backlog completely this might cause a
denial-of-service if preventative measures are not taken by the Server. However, my
scan should never fill the backlog beyond half full for more than one-fifth of a second,
due to the behavior of the Linux kernel. When the backlog is half full the kernel
will remove “mature” packets, including those that I sent to fill the backlog initially
five times every second. Because of this behavior, which I exploit to perform my
scan, my scan will never cause a denial-of-service due to filling the SYN-backlog with
unfinished connection attempts. In this way my technique differs from previously
discussed work, such as that of Knockel and Crandall [45] and Cao et al. [13], in that
my technique does not exhaust the shared, finite resource used as a side-channel.
Another potential issue is that the act of partially filling the SYN-backlog over
a short period of time will be incorrectly identified as the start of an attempted
denial-of-service attack by a system administrator, firewall, or intrusion detection
system. While I cannot guarantee that this will never happen as an initial reaction
to my scan, further inspection of my network traffic will reveal that the transmission
and creation of “half-open” TCP connections lasts a short time, typically only a few
seconds, and is not continuous or large enough to cause sufficient resource allocation
to result in a denial-of-service, as discussed above.
The third issue to be addressed is the amount of network traffic generated by my
scan. When attempting to measure paths with small round trip time values, usually
below 20ms, my scan can send upwards of 800 packets per second when attempting
to trigger the SYN-backlog behavior I use to gather my data. Each of these packets
34

Chapter 3. Off-Path Round Trip Time Measurement
is an unsolicited SYN-ACK packet which will be immediately reset by the Client on
arrival resulting in very little system resources being used to process the packet since
it is immediately reset without any further processing. Each packet is 60 bytes in
size and at a rate of 800 packets per second would result in 48 kilobytes per second
of network traffic, a level that modern systems and networks are more than capable
of handling without noticeably affecting the quality of communication.

3.6

Conclusion

I have presented a novel technique for inferring the round trip time between two Internet end hosts, who meet a few simple behavioral requirements, using side-channels
in the TCP/IP stack of modern Linux kernels. Specifically my technique uses a
side-channel present in the kernel’s SYN-backlog to infer off-path round trip times.
Compared to similar techniques, my system does not require the use of any additional machines, beyond the end hosts and the scanning machine, nor the use of any
protocols beyond standard TCP/IP. I only require that one end host have an open
port and be running a Linux kernel of version 2.6 or higher and that the other end
host respond to unsolicited SYN-ACKs with RST packets.
Unlike previous side-channel techniques for off-path measurement, my technique
does require the use of a third party “proxy” machine to measure round trip time,
nor does it fully exhaust the shared, finite resource that it exploits as a side-channel.
In comparison to other techniques mine also measure network characteristics beyond
simple measures, such as connectivity by measuring round trip time of communication between off-path machines. I accomplish this by causing state changes in the
Linux kernel’s SYN-backlog which result in measurable behavior differences that can
be tied to characteristics of off-path Internet routes.
I have provided an evaluation of my technique “in the wild” and compared my
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estimates with actual round trip time measurements. I evaluated my technique across
a range of round trip times and routes and discussed its strengths and weaknesses
for specific route characteristics. I have shown that my technique is accurate and
discussed possible causes of error that impact my measurement accuracy.
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Chapter 4
Off-Path TCP Connection 4-Tuple
Inference Attack
In this chapter, I describe a novel attack for detecting the presence of an active
TCP connection between an arbitrary client and a remote Linux server using information side-channels present in the Linux kernel’s implementation of global and
per-connection IPv4 IPID values. The attack’s requirements are as follows:
• A server that is a Linux machine running kernel version 4.0 or newer.
• Access to multiple IPv4 addresses to use as attacker addresses.
The proposed attack makes use of the Linux kernel’s behavior of responding to
“unsolicited” SYN-ACKs with a RST. This is the default Linux kernel behavior and is
also described as the proper behavior for handling “unsolicited” SYN-ACKs in RFC
793 [64]. An “unsolicited” SYN-ACK is a SYN-ACK for which no SYN was sent and so
does not represent a potential connection. The number of IPv4 addresses required
for the attack to be reliable is at least multiple hundreds, with thousands increasing
the probability that the attack can be carried out. While requiring this many may
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prove a hindrance to attackers with a small amount of resources it is well within the
realm of possibility for large botnets or nation-state attackers.
By detecting when the Linux kernel changes from using one of its 2048 global
IPID counters to using a per-connection TCP IPID counter, the attack I describe
is able to infer the IP-port 4-tuple that corresponds to an active TCP connection
without being an on-path observer. The IP-port 4-tuple representing an active TCP
connection is the source address, source port, destination address, and destination
port used for TCP communication.
My contributions are as follows:
• I describe a method for using a side-channel present in the Linux kernel’s
implementation of global and per-connection IPv4 packet IPIDs to infer an
active connection’s IP-port 4-tuple. Mine is the first such attack to infer the
existence of a connection completely off-path without exhausting any global
resource.
• I design and implement a proof-of-concept attack for using these side-channels
to detect the presence of active connections between arbitrary Internet end
hosts.
• I provide a detailed analysis and evaluation of the attack, analyze possible
sources of error, and discuss possible mitigations.
A key novelty of the side-channel attack described in this chapter, compared to
past work, is that it does not exhaust any global resource in detecting active connections. To the best of my knowledge, there are only two existing side-channel
attacks in the literature where the existence of a TCP/IP connection could be inferred: Knockel and Crandall [45] , where the global fragment cache was filled and
Cao et al. [13], where a global challenge ACK rate limit was reached. Note that I
38

Chapter 4. Off-Path TCP Connection 4-Tuple Inference Attack
exclude attacks that require malicious code on the victim machine or an attacker
machine behind the same NAT as the victim [17, 33–35, 67]. My attack uses a perdestination (i.e., not global) duplicate ACK limit for one non-default corner case that
I encountered, but is otherwise based on inferring which resource is being used rather
than exhausting a specific resource. This is a major conceptual difference that challenges the notion that there is a direct one-to-one connection between shared, limited
resources and non-trivial network side-channels. While past side-channels have had
the property of not exhausting global shared, limited resources, such as Antirez’s
idle scan [6] for detecting open ports, to date such side-channels have been relatively
trivial and could not reveal information about active connections. What the attack
presented in this chapter demonstrates is that simply enumerating globally shared
resources (rate limits, buffers, caches, etc.) and then considering each in isolation is
not sufficient for enumerating all possible side-channels that can be used to infer a
connection.

The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.1 discusses scenarios
that motivated this chapter. Section 4.2 reviews what an IPID value is, how the Linux
kernel generates IPIDs, what a challenge ACK is, and how the Linux kernel handles
challenge ACKs. Section 4.3 discusses the methods for using IPIDs and challenge ACKs
as side-channels to detect the presence of an active TCP connection. Section 4.4
describes my experimental methodology. Then, I discuss my results in testing the
attack in Section 4.5. In Section 4.6 I discuss the applicability of the attack, the
challenges it faces “in the wild”, common sources of error, and possible mitigations.
I finish with my conclusions in Section 4.7.
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4.1

Motivation

One common assumption made by many privacy tools using the TCP protocol is
that information about the state of an existing connection does not leak outside of
the connection itself. This includes information about whether or not a connection
exists. Many privacy and censorship circumvention tools rely on this to ensure that
this information could only be discovered by an on-path attacker. If an attacker were
able to detect the existence of a connection between a client and a circumvention
tool off-path it, could allow the attacker the possibility of deanonymizing a client,
detecting a hidden service, or other attack vectors.
One scenario where the ability to detect off-path connections is useful is the
case of a user accessing a sensitive website via a Tor [23] bridge, which is a type of
relay that is supposed to be unknown to the censor. The attacker may suspect that
the user is connecting to a bridge and could try to confirm this suspicion. While
there has been evidence of nation-states using active probing to identify such hidden
machines [27], obfuscation protocols such as obfs4 [5] can be used to impede such
probing. Using an attack that could detect an off-path TCP connection an attacker
could attempt to detect a TCP connection between a suspected Tor bridge and a Tor
directory server after a user opens a connection to the Tor bridge. Since this would
detect the connection it would not require active probing that could be impeded by
obfs4 or similar mitigations. Note that once the connection is open the distinction
between client and server is interchangeable for the attack I present. Also note that
six out of 10 Tor directory servers are dual stack [72] allowing an attacker to use both
IPv4 and IPv6 address when attempting to find IPID hash collisions. As multiple
IPv6 addresses are often assigned to a single machine or network, compared to IPv4
addresses, these additional IPv6 addresses provide attackers with a much large pool
of addresses that could be used to find IPID hash collision. While the attack I present
focuses on a simple IPv4 only implementation, there are many different variations
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on the attack to make it practical for any given application.
Generally, the attack I describe in this chapter provides the attacker with a primitive for inferring the existence of connections off-path, which violates assumptions
often made by privacy tools. I focus my experimental methodology on understanding the base accuracy and speed of the attack on one client/server pair in isolation,
whereas a real attacker may have additional flexibility in carrying out the attack
and can use an improved implementation and/or different tradeoffs. Thus, while the
attack as presented in this chapter assumes that the connection persists for roughly
two minutes, and sometimes fails, I establish that the basic attack primitive exists.
A real attacker may implement it differently. For example, for the aforementioned
application of detecting Tor bridges the attacker may look for collisions with any of
a large set of Tor directory servers and guard nodes, all of which Tor bridges are
likely to make persistent connections to, if they are heavily used. The attacker may
repeat attacks for identified connections to avoid false positives, and may be able to
tolerate false negatives because even if a Tor user’s connection is interrupted only
half the time or only after limit use, their quality of service is diminished and they
are likely to use other services that are more reliable (such as government-sponsored
VPNs). And, even if the attack is mitigated (e.g., by filtering out the attack traffic)
the damage may already be done in terms of user trust in a given tool’s availability.

4.2

Background

The attack relies on side-channels in the Linux kernel’s handling of IPv4 IPID values
as a mix of global and per-connection counters.
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4.2.1

IPIDs

IPv4 packet headers contain a 16-bit identification field known as the IP Identifier
(IPID). During the course of transmission it is possible that a given IPv4 packet may
be too large to transmit over a given link. In such cases the packet can be broken
in smaller packets known as fragments, which all retain the original packet’s IPID.
Once these fragments reach their final destination, the receiving machine uses the
IPID value of each fragment to determine how to correctly reassemble the fragments
to rebuild the initial IPv4 packet.
IPv6 packet headers do not contain an IPID field. Instead, when they are fragmented an IPv6 extension header is added containing a fragment ID value which
functions similarly to an IPv4 IPID value. Fragmenting IPv6 packets is never performed by routers, with hosts relying on Path MTU (PMTU) Discovery to determine
the largest packet size and only send packets of that size or smaller. IPv4 can also
use PMTU Discovery but this is not always enabled. In this chapter I will focus on
IPv4 as it is always guaranteed to have an IPID field present.

4.2.2

Linux Kernel IPv4 IPID Values

Early network stack implementations often used a global IPID counter that was
incremented for each packet sent. However, work on idle scans and similar techniques [6,28,29] exploited information side-channels in the global IPID field to make
measurements of off-path machines. This led to the Linux kernelmoving to the adoption of per-destination IPID counters [24]. However, this technique has since been
removed in favor of a mixed approach. This new approach consists of a set of 2048
separate IPID counters. Each connection is assigned a counter to use based on a
hash of the source and destination IP addresses, the protocol number of the IPv4
packet (e.g., TCP, UDP, ICMP), and a random value generated on system boot.

42

Chapter 4. Off-Path TCP Connection 4-Tuple Inference Attack
Research by Knockel and Crandall [45] showed that simple, incrementing, perdestination IPID counters made it possible to use the IPID field to count the number
of packets sent between two machines for UDP and ICMP, and infer the existence
of a TCP connection, completely off-path. Per-destination IPID counters were already being phased out in an experimental version of the kernel because they were
stored in a global resource called the inet peer table that could be exhausted [24],
leading to performance and security problems (because when peers were evicted they
reverted back to a predictable IPID). The global resource that Knockel and Crandall
exhausted to infer IPIDs off-path was the IP fragment cache. In response to Knockel
and Crandall the 2048 separate IPID counters strategy that had been under testing
was released early, with the addition of random noise [25] and hashing of source address and protocol number (in addition to destination address and network secret).
These changes were made after some discussion about if the new IPID strategy were
more resistant to off-path attacks than the old. For Linux’s current IPID implementation, every time a packet is sent the chosen counter (among the 2048) is then
incremented by a random value, chosen from a uniform distribution between one and
the number of system ticks (typically milliseconds) since the last packet transmission
that used the same counter.

4.2.3

IPv4 Do Not Fragment Behavior

While the above IPID behavior is used in most cases, there exists a special case in
the kernel’s handling of TCP connections. As discussed previously in Section 4.2.1,
IPIDs are used to assist in reassembling fragmented IPv4 packets. However, if a
machine is set to use Path MTU Discovery, it will attempt to find the largest packet
size a given route can handle and attempt to only send packets of this size or smaller.
This is done to avoid fragmenting packets during transmission. PMTU Discovery
changes how the Linux kernel chooses IPIDs when sending TCP packets.
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393 void ip_select_ident_segs(...) {
...
398

if ((iph->frag_off & htons(IP_DF)) && !skb->ignore_df) {
...

404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413 }

if (sk && inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr) {
iph->id = htons(inet_sk(sk)->inet_id);
inet_sk(sk)->net_id += segs;
} else {
iph->id = 0;
}
} else {
__ip_select_ident(net, iph, segs);
}

Figure 4.1: Linux kernel IPID selection.

When PMTU Discovery is active the Linux kernel does not pick an IPID from
one of the 2048 counters, discussed in Section 4.2.2, when using TCP and the Do
Not Fragment flag is set. Instead, the kernel picks from a per-socket IPID counter
unique to each TCP socket. Further analysis of this code shows that this code path
is followed by all TCP packets sent by the kernel except SYN-ACK and RST packets
that are not part of an active connection. These packets are assigned an IPID value
from one of the 2048 counters as described previously. Figure 4.1 shows the IPID
selection behavior for Linux kernel version 4.16 [73]. The ip_select_ident_segs
function is eventually called to assign an IPv4 packet an IPID value. On line 398 the
kernel checks to see if the Do Not Fragment flag should be set. If not, the IPID is
chosen from one of the 2048 counters based on its hash value in line 411. Otherwise,
the kernel will ensure that the socket exists and has a known destination address in
line 404 before using the IPID counter from the current socket (line 405). For a full
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source listing see the Linux kernel source code [73]. The attack I describe handles
both cases when the Do Not Fragment flag is and is not set. However, I will focus
on the default Linux kernel configuration which sets the Do Not Fragment flag.

4.2.4

RFC 5961

RFC 5961 was introduced in August 2010 as a method for improving the TCP protocol’s resistance to blind TCP RST attacks. It does so by adding the following behavior
to the standard TCP resetting algorithm:

1. Incoming RST packets are checked to see if they match a valid TCP connection
by verifying that the source address and source port match an established TCP
connection in the machine.
2. The sequence number is compared to the next expected TCP sequence number
and the next TCP window.
• If the TCP sequence number exactly matches the next expected TCP
sequence number the connection is reset as before.
• If the TCP sequence number does not exactly match the next expected
sequence number and is not in the expected TCP window the RST is
ignored.
• If the sequence number does not exactly match and is in the TCP expected
window a challenge ACK packet is sent to the other end host.
3. Then, the machine receiving the challenge ACK responds with a RST packet
with a sequence number exactly matching the acknowledgment number of the
challenge ACK per normal TCP behavior.
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4. Finally, the connection is reset since a RST packet was received using the exact
expected sequence number.
The additions proposed by RFC 5961 appear to address the vulnerability of a
blind TCP RST attack. An off-path attacker who could previously brute force a valid
sequence number and cause a reset must now correctly respond to a challenge ACK
that they can not see. While such an attacker could theoretically guess the correct
sequence number to use as a challenge ACK response they would need to guess from
all 232 possible sequence numbers, an unlikely event.
In my tests and code review of the Linux kernel’s implementation of RFC 5961,
I discovered that Linux sends challenge ACKs in response to unsolicited SYN-ACKs.
This is relevant to my attack because it means I do not need to account for sequence
numbers in the spoofed SYN-ACKs I send (although doing so would simply be a
matter of sending four sets of SYN-ACKs to ensure one set has sequence numbers in
the expected window).

4.3

Implementation

The attack for detecting active TCP connections relies on using the Linux kernel’s
IPID counter behavior and the difference between per-connection TCP counters and
other non TCP counters to detect a connection. As discussed in Section 4.2.2 the
Linux kernel uses 2048 IPID counters that are assigned based on the hash of the IP
addresses and protocol for a given connection.
In order to detect off-path TCP connections the attack I describe requires the
following primitives:
• A reliable method an off-path attacker can use to trigger off-path traffic that
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increments different IPID counters when there is a TCP connection present on
a given port and when there is not a TCP connection.
• A method for counting IPID changes caused by off-path traffic.
• A method for determining which counter off-path traffic used based on the
counted IPID changes.
I will discuss my implementations for all three primitives below and describe how
they can be combined in the attack I describe.

4.3.1

Triggering Off-Path Traffic

To trigger the desired off-path traffic an attacker would need to send packets to
the targeted machine that cause an off-path response, sent over TCP, which will
use different counters when a TCP connection is present on a given IP-Port 4-tuple
and when a TCP connection is not present. As described in Section 4.2.4, if a
TCP connection is present RST packets within the current sequence number window
will trigger a challenge ACK from the server. Out of sequence SYN-ACK packets also
trigger this behavior in the Linux kernel’s network stack. My implementation of
the attack presented uses these out of sequence, or “unsolicited”, SYN-ACK packets,
using the spoofed source IP address of the off-path client machine, to cause the
targeted server to generate off-path challenge ACK packets to be sent to the client
machine. These packets will use the TCP connection’s per-connection IPID counter
to populate the challenge ACK packet’s IPID field. If there is no TCP connection
present for the IP-Port 4-tuple used by the “unsolicited” SYN-ACK, the packet will
trigger a RST packet in response. This RST packet will populate the packet’s IPID
field from one of the 2048 IPID counters, since there is no per-connection counter
to use because there is no TCP connection. By using “unsolicited” SYN-ACKs in this
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way my implementation has a method for triggering off-path TCP traffic that will
use different counters depending on the state of a given IP-Port 4-tuple (i.e., whether
or not a TCP connection exists for a given 4-tuple).

4.3.2

Counting IPIDs

As discussed in Section 4.2.2 the Linux kernel uses a mix of per-connection counters
for established TCP connections and 2048 IPID counters for TCP packets sent outside established TCP connections. In order to count packets my implementation of
the attack relies on counting packets sent outside an established TCP connection.
This can be accomplished via the use of hash collisions in the hashing algorithm
used to determine which of the 2048 IPID counters an outgoing TCP packet uses
when sent outside an established TCP connection. Using this technique an off-path
attacker can ensure that the source IP address they are using pulls from the same
IPID counter that is used when sending off-path traffic. This allows the attacker to
count the number of off-path packets sent by computing the change in IPID between
two probe packets, with the difference being the number of packets sent.

Finding IPID Collisions
In order to find IPID collisions the attack uses a technique similar to that described by
Zhang et al. [83], though only applied to IPv4 addresses. As described in Section 4.2.2
the Linux kernel uses a hash of a connection’s source and destination addresses,
network protocol, and a random value generated on startup. Given this I define an
IPID collision as: For a server with a secret value S and IPv4 address T I say that
an attacker IPv4 address A collides with another IPv4 address C if:
hash(A, T, P ROT O_T CP, S)
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points to the same IPID counter as
hash(C, T, P ROT O_T CP, S)
Since the attack focuses on IPv4 TCP connections and my implementation uses
only IPv4 and TCP packets I can treat the destination address and network protocol
as constant. I assume that the server I am using as the destination of the attack
does not reboot during my scan which allows us to treat the random value used in
the hash as constant. This means that in order to find an IPID collision between
an attacker IPv4 address and the client of an active TCP connection I only need to
find a IPv4 address that would result in the same hash as my client machine’s IPv4
address. Note that while my implementation only uses TCP packets to try to find
IPID collisions, for simplicity, it is possible to use other protocols to increase the
probability of finding a collision, though I did not explore this possibility.
To detect such a collision I can probe the server from a range of IPv4 addresses
checking to see if responses to my TCP probes show the presence of off-path traffic
using the same global IPID counter. First, I send a SYN-ACK packet to the server
from an attacker address. This SYN-ACK is not part of any active connection so the
server will respond with a RST packet. Next, I send a SYN-ACK packet that spoofs the
source address of the client machine. These spoofed packets are sent to find IPID
hash collisions, not active connections, and due to this are sent using a source port
unlikely to be used in an active connection, such as a port outside common ephemeral
port ranges. Once again the server will respond to this SYN-ACK with a RST, since it
is not part of an active connection. Finally, I probe from the attacker address using
a SYN-ACK and receiving a RST. If the attacker’s IPv4 address and the client’s IPv4
address generate the hashes that point to the same counter then their IPIDs will
come from the same IPID counter. I can check if this is the case by computing the
difference between the IPID of the responses to the two probe packets. Assuming
that all 3 packets were sent in under 10ms the random value added to each IPID
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Figure 4.2: Example of behavior with and without an IPID hash collision.

packet as described in Section 4.2.2 will never be larger than one. If the difference
modulo 216 is one then a RST was not sent to the client machine in between my
probes using the counter the attacker’s IPv4 address uses. If the difference is two
then the RST sent to the client used the same IPID counter as the probe packets and
I know that my IPv4 address collides with the client’s IPv4 address. The process of
sending a probe SYN-ACK, spoofed SYN-ACK, and a probe SYN-ACK and checking the
difference between response packet IPIDs can be repeated to validate the accuracy of
a potential collision. Once I have found such a collision I can then proceed with the
attack. For my implementation I chose the simplest method of sequentially scanning
for collisions between each possible client and attacker IPv4 address pair.
As an example, consider Figure 4.2a and Figure 4.2b. In Figure 4.2a the attacker
(M) and the client machine (C) do not have hashes which collide and therefore they
do not use the same IPID counter. When the attacker probes the server (S) the
response has an IPID of 100. Probes sent by the attacker, spoofing the IP address of
the client, use a different IPID counter and each probe gives a different value than if
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Number of Addresses (k) Probability
1
2
4
8
16
32
64
128
256
512
1024
2048
4096
8192
16384
32768

0.00048828
0.00097632
0.00195169
0.00389958
0.00778395
0.01550732
0.03077416
0.06060128
0.11753004
0.22124677
0.39354340
0.63221039
0.86473080
0.98170224
0.99966519
0.99999989

Table 4.1: Probability of a collision amongst k addresses.

a collision had occurred. In Figure 4.2b the attacker and client machines are using
two IP addresses that will cause a collision. In this case I can see the IPIDs use the
same counter and increase by one for each packet sent to either the attacker or the
client machine. The attacker can tell the two cases apart by checking the difference
between its two probes. A difference of one indicates that the attacker’s IP address
does not collide with the client’s and a difference of one plus the number of spoofed
SYN-ACKs sent indicates a collision. In both cases the server is only responding
with RST packets which will always choose an IPID counter from one of the 2048
counters as discussed in Section 4.2.2, avoiding the per-socket counter described in
Section 4.2.3.
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Probability of Finding a Collision
To find a collision an IPv4 address is needed that collides with the client’s IPv4
address on the server. Given that the Linux kernel uses 2048 different IPID counters
based on a hash of connection parameters, any single IPv4 address has a probability
of

1
2048

of its hash colliding with the client’s. If the attacker instead uses a pool of

available IPv4 addresses then the probability of finding a collision within this pool
of addresses increases as the size of pool does. The probability of finding an IPID
hash collision between a given client IPv4 address and k attacker IPv4 addresses can
be calculated as one minus the probability that no collision is found:

(4.1)

P r(X = k) = 1 − (1 − p)k

where k is the number of IPv4 addresses used and p is the probability of any single
IPv4 address colliding,

1
.
2048

Table 4.1 shows the probability of finding a collision when using common CIDR
network sizes.
Example
Consider what happens when I check a 4-tuple that represents an active TCP connection. First, the attacker queries the current IPID value of IPID counter used by
the client machine, via an IPID hash collision discovered previously. Then, when the
attacker sends “unsolicited”, spoofed SYN-ACK packets to the server it will respond
with a challenge ACK, sent to the client. The challenge ACK sent will use the IPID
value from its per-socket counter as shown in Figure 4.3b. Since this is a separate
counter from the IPID counter used for the RST packets sent in response to the attacker’s probe SYN-ACKs it does not increase the IPID counter used and the difference
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(a) No Connection
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Figure 4.3: Checking for a connection.

in IPID between the two RST packets is one. As discussed previously if there is no
active connection on a given 4-tuple each spoofed SYN-ACK packet will cause a RST
to be sent to the client. Since no connection exists each of these RST packets will
use the hash based IPID counter and each RST will increment this counter by one, as
seen in Figure 4.3a. This will cause the difference in IPID between the RST packets
sent in response to the attacker’s probe packets to be the number of spoofed packets
sent plus one.

4.3.3

The Attack

The attack for detecting active TCP connections uses the side-channel for using IPIDs
to count the number of packets sent to differentiate between active and inactive TCP
connection 4-tuples.
First, the attacker finds an IPv4 address that collides with the client IPv4 address
in my potential TCP connection 4-tuple as described previously. Next, assuming a
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colliding IPv4 address was found, the attacker scans a chosen range of potential ports
to try to detect a TCP connection. While the simplest method would be to scan each
potential port one at a time this runs the risk of taking too long to find a connection
before it closes, in the case of short lived connections. This is because the port field
is a 16-bit value giving 216 possible ports. Scanning each of these 65,536 possible
ports that a machine could be using sequentially would likely take more time than
the time a short lived TCP connection exists. To address this problem an attacker
could modify the above attack to check multiple potential ports at once. However
this would cause any parallel scans to interfere with each other since each one would
be probing the same IPID counter.
I address these problems by dividing the range of standard ephemeral ports into
a series of buckets where each bucket contains N connection 4-tuples where the
client’s source port is chosen from the ephemeral ports assigned to the bucket. For
each bucket I send M SYN-ACK probes to each 4-tuple in the bucket. I only query the
IPID value before and after I send all the probes from a given bucket. Based on the
challenge ACK behavior described in Section 4.2 a SYN-ACK probe using a 4-tuple that
does not represent a connection will trigger a RST packet response which increases
the IPID counter by one. A 4-tuple that represents a valid connection will trigger a
challenge ACK using the per-connection counter. Using this information I know that
if a bucket does not contain a 4-tuple that represents a connection the difference in
IPID value of the two queries should be equal to M · N since I send M probes for
each of the N 4-tuples in a bucket. If the bucket does contain a 4-tuple that is an
active connection the IPID difference will be N · (M − 1) as the packets sent via the
active connection use the per-connection IPID counter. By only querying the IPID
value before and after scanning each bucket instead of after each 4-tuple I can simply
send all my M · N 4-tuple probes as fast as possible since I do not have to check for
changes after each one. If I detect a bucket that contains a valid 4-tuple I then scan
each of the N 4-tuples in the bucket until I find a 4-tuple that represents an active
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connection. Using this technique to speed up the attack, my implementation is as
follows:
• Divide the ephemeral port range into buckets containing N ports.
• Scan each bucket as described in above.
• If a bucket containing a valid 4-tuple is found, scan each port in the bucket
individually as described below:
– Send a SYN-ACK from the attacker’s IP address to the server.
– Send 2 or more SYN-ACKs using spoofed packets using the client’s IP address and the target port.
– Send another SYN-ACK from the attacker’s IP address to the server.
For my specific implementation I chose to send eight SYN-ACK packets for each
individual port. I chose eight packets as it provides a large enough number to account
for a small amount of noise caused by other packets using the same IPID counter
while still being small enough to send quickly to avoid the kernel adding its own
noise to the counter. The attack will work for a larger number of packets, though
the more packets that are sent the longer the attack will take.
For each individual port scanned, I measure the IPID difference before and after sending all eight SYN-ACK packets. If the difference is less than the number of
SYN-ACK probes sent to the potential 4-tuple minus one then I consider the port to
be a potential TCP connection. I chose this threshold to allow for a small amount
of noise from outside traffic to impact the IPID without greatly impacting my implementation. If the difference is greater than or equal to the number of SYN-ACK
probes sent to the potential 4-tuple, minus one, I conclude that the 4-tuple does not
represent a valid TCP connection and move to scan the next possible 4-tuple.
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4.4

Experimental Setup

In testing the effectiveness of the attack I wanted to answer three main questions:
1. How effective was the attack “in the wild”?
2. Was the attack robust to noise that might be present “in the wild”?
3. How fast was the attack and is this fast enough to be practically usable?
In order to answer these three questions I opened TCP connections with popular
web servers, that met the attack’s required criteria, and attempted to use the attack
to detect these connections from a third “attacker” machine. The attack requires:
• A target server that is a Linux machine running kernel version 4.0 or newer.
• Access to multiple IPv4 addresses to use as attacker addresses.
My experiment proceeded as follows:
1. Using the top 250 sites from the Alexa Top Global Sites [4] I made a DNS A
lookup for each and recorded all IPv4 addresses returned by the lookup.
2. Each IPv4 address was then scanned to check if it met the criteria for the
attack.
3. For each IPv4 address that met the criteria for the attack I generated all
unique pairs of IPv4 addresses from a set of 242 IPv4 addresses on my research
network. These pairs were then used as client and attacker IPv4 addresses
along with a valid server address to use when trying to find IPID collisions in
the next step.
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4. Once I had generated all client and attacker IPv4 address pairs I scanned each
server IPv4 address that met my criteria to try and find IPID collisions on the
server between a given client and attacker pair. Each pair that collides was
then cached as a collision pair to be used in the full attack.
5. I then carry out the attack both before and after opening a TCP connection
with each server IPv4 address. No data is sent to the server during the attack
except TCP keep-alive packets to ensure the connection remains active during
the course of the attack.
6. Once the attack has finished I close the TCP connection and log the results.
I chose to use the sites from the Alexa Top 250 as these represent some of the most
popular and highly trafficked websites. Due to this, these machines can be viewed
as a plausible worst case scenario for the attack. This is because such large amounts
of traffic increases the likelihood that another connection’s IPID hash collides with
the client and the attacker’s IPID hash. This traffic can be TCP traffic, such as
RST packets, that use one of the 2048 global counters to populate the IPID field
or non-TCP traffic (e.g., ICMP or UDP). In these cases any such collisions will add
additional noise to the IPID counter, making precise changes more difficult to detect.
Such noise makes these sites an excellent set to test the attack’s robustness when
dealing with noisy machines.
When choosing ephemeral ports to use as client source ports I wanted to choose
a range that covered common operating system default values. TCP ports are represented as 16-bit integers, with the first 1024 usually reserved for common services. This leaves 64,512 potential ephemeral ports that could possibly be used as
a client’s source port. However, many operating systems do not use this full range
of ports by default. Linux uses the range [32, 768, 61, 000] as available ephemeral
TCP ports. The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) recommends that
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ephemeral ports be chosen from the range [49, 152, 65, 535] [20]. Since Windows
Vista, Microsoft operating systems have used the IANA range of ephemeral ports.
An attacker would likely pick one of these two ranges to maximize the number of
client machine’s whose connections could be attacked while also avoiding attempting
to scan all possible ephemeral ports. For my experiments I chose to use a hybrid
range of [32, 768, 65, 535] as possible ephemeral ports to cover both the IANA range
and the Linux range.
All client and measurement IPv4 addresses used were unbound addresses chosen
from a set of 242 IPv4 addresses on my measurement network. The measurement
machine I used responded to all packets sent to these addresses. The measurement
machine was an Ubuntu Linux machine running Ubuntu 16.04 LTS with Linux kernel
version 4.4. In a real attack, the packet delays, packet loss, and other characteristics
of the Internet between the measurement machine and the server would have an
effect on the attack, but for the client the Internet characteristics between the client
machine and the server are not relevant to the attack, since the client IP is simply kept
as state on the server for an open TCP connection from the attacker’s perspective.
Therefore my experimental setup is identical to a real attack in terms of Internet
traffic considerations.

4.5

Analysis

In this section I describe the results of my experiment and discuss potential factors
that could impact the attack’s effectiveness. As described in Section 4.4 I chose
web sites from the Alexa Top 250 as servers. After performing DNS A lookups for
each host I obtained 464 unique IPv4 addresses to use as server machines. Of these
464 IPv4 addresses I found 182 (39.22%) that met the required behavior criteria: a
machine running a Linux kernel version 4.0 or newer, that responded to “unsolicited”
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Scans

Connection
True Positive

2593

False Negative

No Connection
False Positive

#

%

#

%

#

2194

84.61%

282

10.88%

117

%
4.51%

True Negative

False Positive

#

%

#

2452

94.56%

141

%
5.44%

Table 4.2: Overall accuracy of the attack.
SYN-ACK packets with RST packets. Of these 182 IPv4 addresses I was able to find
valid IPID collisions between a pair of my 242 measurement IPv4 addresses and 136
(74.73%) server addresses. I carried out 2,593 total mock attacks, over the course
of 7 days, on active TCP connections between an IPv4 address from the Alexa Top
250 and a client IP address on my own network. Each scan attempted to detect the
presence of a TCP connection before and during an active TCP connection.

4.5.1

Analysis of the Attack’s Accuracy

When describing my results I separate attacks where no TCP connection existed from
those where a TCP connection does exist. Overall there are four possible outcomes,
depending on whether or not a connection existed:
• True Positive: A connection exists and the attack found the 4-tuple corresponding to the connection correctly.
• True Negative: No connection exists and the attack found no connection.
• False Positive: No connection exists and the attack found a connection or a
connection exists and the attack found an incorrect 4-tuple for the connection.
• False Negative: A connection exists and the attack failed to find the connection.
In cases where a connection did exist the attack was able to detect the TCP
connection 84.61% of the time with a false positive rate of 4.51% and a false negative
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rate of 10.88%. When no connection was present the attack was able to correctly
detect this 94.56% of the time with a false positive rate of 5.44%. Table 4.2 shows
my overall results.

4.5.2

Analysis of the Attack’s Runtime Performance

In addition to analyzing the accuracy of the attack I also analyzed the performance
of the attack when scanning the standard Linux kernel’s ephemeral port range for
active TCP connections. If this scanning takes too long to complete then it is possible
that an attacker would miss the existence of a short lived connection.
Using the same set of server IPv4 addresses and IPID collisions used in the
accuracy analysis detailed in Section 4.5.1 I measured the time the attack took to
either find an active TCP connection or scan the chosen ephemeral port range. On
average the attack takes 75.81 seconds to find an active TCP connection. When
there is no connection the attack takes 135.59 seconds on average to scan the chosen
ephemeral port range and confirm there is no connection. How fast the attack needs
to be depends on a lot of context that will vary across different potential types of
attacks (e.g., Is the connection repeated so that multiple attempts can be made?
What are the keepalive settings of the server and browser? Is it an application
that has persistent connections, such as Tor?).

4.6

Discussion

In this section I discuss the potential applicability of the attack, factors that I noticed
during my experiments that affect the applicability of the attack, possible mitigations
that could be taken against the attack, and ethical considerations I made in designing
my experiments.
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4.6.1

Applicability

As discussed previously this attack requires the use of multiple attacker IPv4 addresses to increase the probability of an attacker finding a valid IPID hash collision
so that IPID values of attacker packets and client packets use the same IPID counter.
In order to have a 50% probability of finding a collision an attacker would need to
use approximately 1400 IPv4 addresses. To have a 90% or greater probability an
attacker would need approximately 4700 IPv4 addresses. While access to this many
available IPv4 addresses is likely beyond the capabilities of a simple attacker it is
within the realm of availability for a large botnet or nation-state attacker. Previous
work studying the Great Cannon [56] and the Great Firewall of China’s attempts to
actively probe Tor bridges [27] shows that some nation-states likely already possess
the ability to spoof thousands of IPv4 addresses, 13,183 and 16,083 respectively, most
of which came from the same /16 subnet. If similar numbers of IPv4 addresses were
used to implement the attack I describe in this chapter, an attacker would have a
greater than 99% probability of finding a valid collision that could be used to detect
an active TCP connection with a chosen, vulnerable Linux machine.

I assume that the attacker has a reason to suspect that the victim machine is
making a connection to a given server, and that this is likely the case. The base
rate fallacy [8] would apply if the likelihood that the connection actually exists is
relatively low. This depends on the overall goals of the attacker and context of the
attack, which may also mitigate the effects of the base rate fallacy. For example, if an
attacker’s goal is to know if a given client is connected to the guard node associated
with a Tor circuit, a higher false positive rate may be tolerable because this is simply
another lead to follow in a broader and more thorough investigation.
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4.6.2

Sources of Error

During the course of my experiments I noticed three main causes of errors that
impacted the effectiveness of the attack. The first cause was noise causing larger
than expected IPID increases. The most likely cause of this behavior is additional
machines connecting to the server whose IPv4 addresses hash to use the same IPID
counter as an attacker IPv4 address. Each packet these additional connections send
increases the IPID counter in addition to the increases caused by the attack. This
additional increase can cause the IPID counter an attacker is using to increase beyond
the number of probe packets expected making it appear that no challenge ACK was
sent when scanning a given 4-tuple as described in Section 4.3. One method for
accounting for this noise would be to try modeling the noise. Ensafi et al. [27, 28]
used ARMA modeling to account for noise affecting the global IPID counters. Pearce
et al. [62] accounted for noisy IPID counters by using Sequential Hypothesis Testing,
while ONIS [83] modeled noise and accounted for it by using the Akaike Information
Criterion. The attack I have described does not attempt to handle detected cases of
noise; instead I leave this possibility for future work.
The second cause of errors I noticed is that certain IPv4 addresses I used as servers
would change the IPID counter being used after successfully finding an IPID hash
collision. Since I cached all located IPID collisions as described in Section 4.3 this
caused any subsequent attempts using the cached collision to fail. An attacker using
a similar system of caching known collisions would be forced to try to find another
valid collision before continuing their attack. I noticed these changes occurring on
the order of hours and not minutes meaning that single attacks or those not using
a similar system of caching collisions are unlikely to be affected. Performing an
additional test to ensure the chosen collision is still valid before launching the full
attack mitigates this source of error.
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There are two likely explanations for this changing collision behavior. The first
is that the target machine was restarted. As discussed previously in Section 4.2
a random value is included as part of the IPID hash to prevent the possibility of
precalculated collisions. This value is chosen when a machine boots and remains
unchanged while the machine is still running. Any precomputed collisions that use
a server that restarts will become invalid whenever that server restarts. The second
possibility is that these IPv4 addresses represent multiple machines assigned the
same IPv4 address via load balancing or an address translation protocol. If this
is the case when an attacker first finds a collision it is valid for one of the set of
machines assigned a given IPv4 address. However, if the attacker later attempts to
reuse the same collision the load balancing or address translation system could send
the attacker’s traffic and the client’s traffic to different machines. This would result in
the collision no longer being valid and all subsequent attacks would fail. Popular web
sites are likely to use load balancing techniques to improve overall performance and
an attacker would need to detect whenever this case has occurred and appropriately
handle when it has. I leave the development of such a technique to future work, and
note that prior TCP/IP side-channel attacks (e.g., Cao et al. [13] and Knockel and
Crandall [45]) are also affected by layer 4 load balancing, making it an interesting
open problem in general.
The third source of error I noticed was the largest cause of false positives in
my data. These errors were caused by packets arriving out of order and the server
responding to the attacker’s second probe packet before all the spoofed packets.
Recall the attack as described in Section 4.3. At two points during the attack I
send N spoofed packets using a given spoofed 4-tuple while sending probe packets
from the attacker IPv4 address before and after sending the spoofed packets. My
implementation assumes that responses to all N packets are sent before the response
to the second attacker probe. In the event that these packets arrive out of order
the second attacker probe will have an IPID value that is in the middle of the IPID
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values given to packets sent in response to the N probes. This results in a given probe
appearing to cause less packets to be sent making it seem like the probe triggered the
packets that used the per-connection IPID counter. This causes the attack to either
detect a connection where none existed or to detect a connection on an incorrect port.
Given my low false positive rate of less than 5% this does not occur frequently and
could be mitigated by rerunning the attack multiple times. I leave the development
of techniques to detect and better handle packet reordering to future work.

4.6.3

Mitigations

There are a number of possible mitigations the Linux kernel could use to try and
prevent this attack. The immediate place to consider mitigations is the Linux kernel’s
IPID behavior.
The kernel could change the IPID counter behavior it uses to try to remove
any information flows that could be used as a side-channel. However there is no
obvious choice for the behavior that should be chosen. If the kernel were to use
per-destination IPID counters, as it did previously, then the kernel would again be
vulnerable to side-channel attacks such as those discussed by Knockel and Crandall [45]. Moving to any type of global IPID counter is also a poor choice as it would
remove the need for an attacker to have hundreds of IPv4 addresses available to find
IPID hash collisions, though it would increase the amount of noise present for active
machines.
One possibility is that the Linux kernel could use a constant IPID for RST packets
that are not part of an active TCP connection. RST packets should not contain any
data and as a result should never be fragmented. Using a constant IPID for such
packets would make it impossible for the attack I have described to determine if
off-path packets have been transmitted, removing the attack’s ability to tell whether
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the traffic used a per-connection counter or one of the 2048 global counters. This
solution would mitigate the attack I have described, though it does still allow an
off-path attacker to count non-TCP packets via IPID hash counter collisions.
Another possibility is to use random IPID values for each outgoing packet. This is
the approach taken by some versions of BSD-based operating systems, including Mac
OSX. Using this approach, for each packet that is sent a random value is generated
and used as the IPID field. This removes any ability for an off-path attacker to count
IPID differences, assuming the random number generation scheme is sufficiently difficult to predict. However, this approach adds additional overhead computing random
values to each outgoing packet, which may have undesirable performance overhead.

4.6.4

Ethical Considerations

In order to avoid potentially exhausting resources on the server machines I used in
my experiment I strove to follow best practices. I only initiated one TCP connection
at a time with a given server and all TCP connections were completed to avoid taking
up resources with “half-open” TCP connections. Once I had finished a given scan I
closed and reset each connection immediately, to avoid using up server resources. All
of my probe packets are SYN-ACK packets, which are immediately reset by the server.
At no point do I test the attack described on any TCP connection other than those
I have initiated. Via reverse DNS my client and measurement machine IPs pointed
to a website that explained the nature of my study and gave contact information for
network administrators to opt out of my probes, and I have arranged for all abuse
complaints for my research network to be forwarded directly to me. I received no
opt-out requests or abuse complaints at any time during this study.
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Disclosure
I disclosed the side-channels used in the attack to the Linux kernel developers on
August 22, 2018. After discussing the attack and possible mitigations, the Linux
developers released a patch that mitigated the attack on September 11, 2018. The
chosen mitigation strategy was to have the Linux kernel use an IPID of zero for all
TCP RST packets sent outside an established TCP connection. As I discussed previously this removes the side-channel which allows an off-path attacker to determine
whether off-path TCP traffic was using one of the 2048 global IPID counters or a
per-connection counter and detect the presence of a TCP connection. As result,
Linux kernel versions 4.18 and newer are no longer vulnerable to the attack I have
described. However, the underlying side channel still remains for other protocols and
could be used to attack user privacy in applications that use these protocols (e.g.,
UDP-based protocols such as DNS).

4.7

Conclusion

I have presented a novel off-path attack that can detect the presence of an active
TCP connection between a remote Linux server and an arbitrary client using sidechannels present in the Linux kernel. The attack leverages side-channels in the
kernel’s implementation of shared and per-connection counters. This attack is a
purely off-path attack that does not require access to any packets sent between the
client and the server. All that is required to reliably use the attack is access to
multiple IPv4 addresses for the measurement, that the server machine be running
a Linux kernel of version 4.0 or higher, and that the server responds to unsolicited
SYN-ACK packets with RST packets.
Compared to previous attacks which could detect TCP connections off-path [13,
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45] my attack does not fully exhaust the shared, finite resource it uses as a sidechannel. Instead my attack uses a side-channel not to see if a shared, finite resource
has been exhausted but rather which resource is being used. I am able to do this by
associating changes in the Linux kernel’s networking state with dependent changes
in the usage of the shared, finite resources used to populate IPv4 packet IPID fields.
This indicates that networking side-channels can potentially exist in cases where any
shared state or information is used to determine network state behavior. This means
that enumeration and hardening of shared, finite resources such as global rate limits
or shared buffers is likely to be insufficient when attempting to harden networking
stacks against side-channel attacks.
I have provided an evaluation of the attack “in the wild” and discussed its effectiveness and performance. I have shown that the attack is accurate and can be
run quickly enough to detect active connections that persist for an average of 76
seconds or longer. In addition I have discussed the potential applicability of the
attack, sources of error that would affect its applicability, and possible mitigations
against the attack. Finally, I have discussed what this attack can tell us about yet
undiscovered TCP/IP side channels that past attacks could not.
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Internet-Wide Measurement of
Likely IPID Side-Channels and
Behavior
In this chapter, I describe my work studying IPv4 IPID value generation and uniqueness across the entire IPv4 address space. Previous work has only studied IPID
generation across subsets of the IPv4 address space and made assumptions as to the
number of different IPID generation schemes.
The purpose of my study is two-fold: To develop a method for trying to detect
likely IPID side-channels via large-scale scanning and black-box testing. My previous
work, as well as related works, often require researchers to manually reverse engineer
the network stack of various systems to find side-channels that can be leveraged
to create new scanning techniques or which represent new security vulnerabilities.
This is a time consuming process and often requires direct access to source code or
compiled binaries, making it difficult to apply to specialized network hardware (e.g.,
Internet backbone routers, embedded systems, Internet-of-Things devices).
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Techniques for carrying out blackbox testing could help automate this part of this
process or provide a list of systems likely to contain side-channels, to help narrow
down areas where more focused research would be fruitful. To study IPID generation
methods across the entire IPv4 address space and provide a richer picture than those
presented by previous studies. This is helpful in providing a more complete picture of
the number of systems that could be used in side-channel based attacks or scanning
techniques. Since previous studies only scanned a subset of available IPv4 addresses,
often chosen from publicly provided lists of web servers, DNS servers, or popular
services the overall trends they report on may not be accurate or provide a complete
picture of IPID behavior on the Internet as a whole.
In addition to providing a more complete picture of IPID behaviors on the Internet that could contain side-channels, my study also provides analysis of Internet
behaviors that make side-channels more difficult to use. As discussed in Section 4.6.2,
load-balancing systems can present problems for side-channel based techniques by
sending packets sent to a single IP address to different machines, making accurate
usage of side-channels difficult, if not impossible. The work I present in this Chapter
will provide a current view of the prevalence of load-balancing and other systems
that can impact side-channel techniques.
My contributions are as follows:
• An IPv4 Internet wide scan and analysis of the different IPID generation behaviors observed.
• Analysis of those IPID generation behaviors that appear to contain shared
information flows that could be leveraged as information side-channels.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.1 discusses common
IPID generation schemes and the possible ways each can be used as a side-channel.
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Section 5.2 describes the scan I performed to gather data about the kinds of IPID
generation schemes present across the entire IPv4 address space, while Section 5.4
details the results of my scan. In Section 5.5 I discuss the implications of my results
and finish with my conclusions in Section 5.7.

5.1

Background

As discussed in Chapter 4, every IPv4 packet header contains a 16-bit identification
field referred to as the IPID, as defined in RFC 791 [65]. RFC 791 states that each
IPID must be unique for the 3-tuple containing a packet’s source address, destination
address, and protocol number for as long as the packet, or any of its fragments, could
be alive on the Internet. While this could be handled via the use of one IPID counter
per destination host, this would be impractical given the IPID field is only 16 bits
in length and is unable to provide a unique value for each of the 232 possible IPv4
addresses. Instead, it may simply be easier to use unique identifiers for each packet,
regardless of destination, a practice that most operating systems choose to follow.
The specification for the usage and generation of the IPID field was updated in
RFC 6864 [74]. This RFC updated the IPID field to better match its current use case
on the Internet and to more clearly define the purposes for which the IPID should
be used. Specifically RFC 6864 updates the IPID field specification as follows:
• The IPID field MUST NOT be used for any purpose other than packet fragmentation and reassembly.
• Originating sources MAY set the IPID field of atomic packets to any value.
• All devices that examine IPv4 headers MUST ignore the IPID field of atomic
packets.
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These changes focus on the use of IPID values in atomic packets. Atomic packets
are IPv4 packets which are small enough to fit within the minimum packet size
for IPv4 packets, as specified in RFC 791, without fragmentation. This minimum
packet size is 68 bytes. Since atomic fragments can be transmitted without ever
being fragmented, and the IPID field should only be used for packet fragmentation,
the value of the IPID field is irrelevant for atomic packets.

5.1.1

Common IPID Generation Methods

Previous work studying IPID behavior [70] discussed four common IPID generation
methods. The first of these is one using a shared, global, incrementing counter.
In this generation method a given machine has a single, shared counter which is
incremented by a constant value every time a packet is transmitted. Another common
IPID generation method, designed to mitigate security issues of a shared, global,
incrementing counter, is to use per-host or per-connection counters. In this method
each unique IP address or established, stateful connection uses its own unique counter
for each packet sent to a given host or via a given connection. Two less common IPID
generation schemes described are a constant value and random values. In a constant
IPID generation scheme every outgoing packet uses the same, constant value. This
method prevents the effective use of IPv4 fragmentation of such packets and does not
conform to the RFC describing IPv4 and IPID generation. The random generation
scheme assigns a random IPID value to each outgoing packet. In contrast to the
other commonly used methods, the random method includes a higher performance
cost as each outgoing packet requires the generation of a random number instead of
simply reading and incrementing a counter.
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5.1.2

Shared Global Counter as a Side-Channel

The most common early IPID generation method was the usage of a shared, global,
incrementing counter. Operating systems using this method provided an easy to
access side-channel that allowed for the trivial counting of the number of off-path
packets sent by a given machine. All that an attacker needs to do to count the
number of packets is to send their own probes and calculate the IPID difference
between each set of probe responses. Consider a machine, using a shared, global,
incrementing counter being scanned by an attacker. First, the attacker sends a probe
packet that will cause the remote machine to respond to the attacker’s machine. This
response will be assigned the current value of the shared IPID counter, which will
then be incremented. This increment is most often a simple increase of one but
some operating systems use another constant value (e.g., 8, 256, 512). The attacker
then attempts to trigger off-path traffic between then chosen remote machine and
another machine. Assuming the attacker is able to trigger such off-path traffic, all
outgoing off-path traffic will be assigned the current IPID value which will then be
incremented. Then, the attacker sends a second probe packet to the remote machine.
This response will use the current IPID counter. The difference between the first
and second probe packet responses the attacker receives will then indicate the total
number of packets sent as a result of off-path traffic. This provides a simple, yet
flexible, side-channel for an attacker to exploit to gain information about the offpath behavior of the remote machine.

5.1.3

Per-Host Counters as a Side-Channel

Per-host IPID counters present a more difficult challenge for attackers attempting to
use the IPID field as a side-channel. Work by Knockel and Crandall [45] showed that
per-host counters can be used with additional side-channels in other shared, finite
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resources (e.g., global fragmentation caches or other shared memory buffers) to infer
information about off-path connections.
In Chapter 4 I discussed my work developing an attack that takes advantage of
the Linux kernel using a mix of shared and per-host IPID counters. My attack takes
advantage of the Linux kernel using different counters depending on the state of TCP
connections to detect which counter is used as a side-channel to detect active TCP
connections.
As my own work and prior work has shown, per-host IPID counters can still be
used as side-channels. However, when compared to shared, global IPID counters,
per-host counters often require an additional side-channel or the presence of associated behavior changes to allow attackers to infer off-path information via these
side-channels. This is due to the lack of direct information flow between separate
counters.

5.1.4

Random Values as a Side-Channel

Random IPID values have been previously described as an uncommon occurrence on
the Internet, but is a method of IPID generation that has seen some recent, growing
interest. Unlike other generation schemes a randomly assigned IPID, when generated
using sufficient randomness and with replacement, should be practically impossible
to predict and eliminate any information flows through the IPID field in outgoing
packets. However, such as system is unlikely to be fully RFC compliant, as the
possibility exists that two outgoing packets could have the same randomly generated
IPID value. In addition, it is computationally expensive to generate truly random
numbers most systems instead choose to use a pseudo-random number generator
(PRNG). Due to their pseudo-random nature PRNGs are deterministic and poorly
designed or implemented PRNGs generate a sequence of values that it is possible
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to predict. An attacker who gains sufficient information about the PRNG a given
operating system uses can predict the sequence of IPID values the system will use.
Once this is accomplished the attacker can count packets in much the same way they
could for a shared, global IPID counter. Instead of calculating the difference between
the IPIDs of the attacker’s probe packets the attacker would compute the number
of random values that a given PRNG must have generated between the IPIDs of
the responses to their probe packets. Klein [44] describes how a predictable PRNG
used in older version of OpenBSD, NetBSD, FreeBSD, and Mac OS X could allow an
attacker to predict upcoming IPIDs, opening the possibility of these systems being
used as part of an off-path idle scan or other IPID-based side-channels.

5.2

Experimental Setup

To study IPID generation algorithms used across the entire IPv4 address space I
wanted to focus on how IPIDs were generated for different kinds of packets, protocols,
and source IP addresses. To this end my scans were as follows:
• Single source address mixed TCP and ICMP scan.
• Multiple source address TCP scan.
For all scans packets were sent at 10ms intervals (i.e., The first packet was sent,
after 10ms the second packet was sent and so on.) and a 100ms “cooldown” was
implemented between each scan. This “cooldown” period served two purposes: First,
it was designed to ensure that a scan target was not subject to a persistent stream of
packets that could be interpreted as a Denial-of-Service attack or cause connection
issues. Second, this “cooldown” ensured that subsequent scans did not occur one
immediately after the other, potentially causing them to interfere with each other.

74

Chapter 5. Internet-Wide Measurement of Likely IPID Side-Channels and Behavior
While round-trip-times greater than 100ms are not uncommon on the Internet, this
“cooldown” needs to be greater than common round-trip-time variances, not the
round-trip-time values, to avoid packet reordering causing interference between scans.
The value of 100ms was chosen empirically, as it seemed to give the best trade-off
between avoiding subsequent scans interfering with each other and allowing each
scan to complete quickly enough that the overall scan did not take too much time.

5.2.1

Single Source Address Mixed TCP/ICMP Scan

The single source address mixed TCP/ICMP scan consists of one type of TCP packet,
TCP SYN-ACKs, and one type of ICMP packet, ICMP Echo Requests, sent in alternating order (i.e., TCP packet, ICMP packet, TCP packet, ICMP packet, etc.).
The goal of this scan is to determine how a given host generates IPIDs for different
protocols. The Linux kernel uses a generation scheme where different protocols use
different IPID counters, as I discussed in Section 4.2. The goal of this scan is determine how widespread this type of generation behavior is and if there exist operating
systems other than Linux that have similar behavior.

5.2.2

Multiple Source Address TCP Scan

In the multiple source address TCP scan, I scan from two different IPv4 source
addresses, alternating which address is used for each outgoing packet. The goal of
this scan is to study how many different systems use some form of per-host or perdestination IPID counters. As with the single source TCP scan, four different types
of TCP packets are sent in groups of thirty-two. The types of TCP packets are the
same as those described in the single source TCP scan.
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5.3

Analysis

In this section I describe the data analysis techniques I used to study IPv4 Internet
IPID generation and uniqueness behaviors. In order to get a better understanding of
the different types of IPID generation and uniqueness behaviors and their prevalence
on the IPv4 Internet, I chose to analyze the data collected during my Internet-scale
scan using hierarchical clustering: without making assumptions about predefined
IPID behaviors. I chose to use hierarchical clustering because the goal of my scan
was to study and better understand the different types of IPID behavior my scan
recorded. Hierarchical clustering, as a descriptive data analysis tool, fits this goal
better than a predictive classification method.

5.3.1

Dataset Size

Overall, my scan received responses from 57,706,077 unique IPv4 addresses. Of
these, 55,166,980 IPv4 addresses responded to the Multiple Source Address TCP
Scan and 21,336,820 IPv4 addresses responded to the Single Source Address Mixed
TCP/ICMP Scan. The set of unique IPv4 addresses which responded to both scans
contained 18,797,723 IPv4 addresses. Of these IPv4 addresses I determined that
8,483,921 provided a sufficient number of responses to build a reliable set of features and use the hierarchical clustering described below. It is these 8,483,921 IPv4
addresses that make up the dataset I analyzed.

5.3.2

Data Preprocessing and Feature Extraction

Hierarchical clustering is an unsupervised learning technique that has proven to be
useful in a variety of data analysis contexts. Clustering is often performed either
directly on raw data or on a set of features derived from the raw data. For my work I
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chose to derive a set of features from each of my data points and perform hierarchical
clustering using these features, instead of the raw data. Given the potential size of my
dataset and the number of potential dimensions that would exist for each individual
IPID value sent by a scanned IPv4 address, the usage of features over raw data
allows for a more tractable amount of data analysis. This comes from the reduced
dimensionality of the feature set compared to the raw data. In addition, prior work
by Salutari et al. [70] made use of features, when studying IPID behaviors with
respect to only IPv4 address changes, indicating that such a technique is a viable
approach to studying IPID values.
As discussed previously in Section 5.2, I used data collected from two tests, Single
Source Multiple Protocol and Multiple Source Single Protocol test, as the data to
use for my analysis. These tests provided data that would allow me to not only
test behavioral changes related to the use of different source IPv4 addresses, similar
to the work done by Salutari et al. [70], but to also test behavioral changes related
to the use of different protocols. Given that the Linux kernel will choose different
IPID values when either of these fields changes, as discussed in Section 4.2, this is
important as only studying one type of change could provide an incomplete picture
when compared with known IPID behavior.
Responses to each of these tests are then split into sequences of packets based on
the field which is changed during the test. For packets received in response to the
Single Source Multiple Protocol test received packets are divided into two sequences:
xtcp which contains responses to the TCP probe packets, and xicmp which contains
responses to the ICMP probe packets. The Multiple Source Single Protocol responses
are also divided into two sequences: ya which contains responses to probes sent using
IPv4 address a, and yb which contains responses to probes sent using IPv4 address b.
It is these four sequences xtcp , xicmp , ya , and yb from which all features are derived.
Table 5.1 contains the full list of features derived from my data and used during
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Feature

Description

H(xtcp )
H(xicmp )
H(ya )
H(yb )
S(xtcp )
S(xicmp )
S(ya )
S(yb )
ks(xtcp , xicmp )
ks(xtcp , ya )
ks(xtcp , yb )
ks(ya , yb )
corr(xtcp , xicmp )
corr(xtcp , ya )
corr(xtcp , yb )
corr(ya , yb )

Entropy of sequence xtcp
Entropy of sequence xicmp
Entropy of sequence ya
Entropy of sequence yb
Circular standard deviation of sequence xtcp
Circular standard deviation of sequence xicmp
Circular standard deviation of sequence ya
Circular standard deviation of sequence yb
2-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov score between
2-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov score between
2-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov score between
2-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov score between
Circular correlation between xtcp and xicmp
Circular correlation between xtcp and ya
Circular correlation between xtcp and yb
Circular correlation between ya and yb

xtcp and xicmp
xtcp and ya
xtcp and yb
ya and yb

Table 5.1: Features derived from raw data.

hierarchical clustering. Each feature is described in more detail below.

Entropy
One of the features I derive from each of the above sequences (i.e., xtcp , xicmp , ya ,
and yb ) is entropy. For this feature I calculate the entropy of each sequence, in bits.
Used in this way entropy can be seen as a measure of how many repeated or constant
values each sequence contains. This is useful in separating between IPID behaviors
that return constant values and those that generate unique values for each packet.
Note that, I use the term entropy informally to refer to the entropy of the process
that generated the sequence. Sequences have algorithmic entropy, but entropy is a
property of a process, not a sequence.
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Kolmogorov-Smirnov Statistic
Another feature I derived was based on the 2-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S) represents a two-sided hypothesis test used to
test whether two independent samples are drawn from the same underlying distribution. The K-S test commonly provides two values, a K-S statistic (D) and a p-value
(p). Based on the size of the two samples and the desired p-value to meet or exceed,
a critical-value (c) can be calculated that can be used as a threshold value for the
given K-S statistic. If the K-S statistic is less than this critical-value then we cannot
reject the null hypothesis that the two samples come from the same distribution. In
order to use the K-S statistic as a feature I apply to following function to the results
of a 2 sample K-S test, ks(x, y) applied to a subset of the possible pairs of sequences
derived from each test:


0 D < c
ks(x, y) =

D otherwise
This feature provides a way to determine if two sequence of IPIDs are likely to have
been generated using the same underlying method or pulled from the same counter.
As an example of where this could prove useful, consider the following two sequences
of IPIDs:
x = [1, 3, 5, 7, . . . , 25, 27, 29, 31]
y = [2, 4, 6, 8, . . . , 26, 28, 30, 32]
these two sequences are likely to have been generated from the value of a shared,
global IPID counter. Each packet sent causes the counter to increment resulting in a
difference of 1 between subsequent packets, assuming trigger packets were sent in a
way such that responses would alternate which sequence they belong to. These two
sequences will have a very high K-S value, indicating that it is very likely they are
from the same distribution or counter.
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Next, consider the following two sequences:
a = [2, 4, 6, 8, . . . , 26, 28, 30, 32]
b = [1000, 1002, 1004, 1006, . . . , 1024, 1026, 1028, 1030]
these sequences have a difference of 2 between each measurement within each sequence, just as the sequences x and y described above. However, it is clear that
these two sequences do not come from the same underlying counter or distribution.
These sequences are likely to have a very small K-S value, indicating that they are
likely not from the same distribution or counter. The K-S statistic provides a way to
differentiate between these two possible scenarios and help determine when a machine
may be using a predictable counter or distribution to populate IPID values.

Circular Standard Deviation and Correlation
To the best of my knowledge, prior work studying IPID behavior that used common
statistics, such as mean, standard deviation, and correlation, treated the sequence
of IPID used as a linear sequence. While this performs well with compact IPID
sequences that have relatively small difference between subsequent values it does
not provide an accurate picture of the statistical behavior of IPID sequences when
subsequent IPIDs have large differences between them or cross the “wrap-around”
point. This “wrap-around” point occurs when an IPID value, which is represented
as a 16-bit field, is incremented to a value greater than can be represented in 16 bits.
The standard behavior when this occurs is for the 16-bit field to “wrap-around”,
beginning again from 0. These “wrap-arounds” cause IPID sequences to behave like
circular data instead of linear data. As an example, consider the following sequence
of IPIDs:
[65521, 65522, 65523, . . . , 65535, 0, 1, . . . , 13, 14, 15]
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Using the common, linear method for calculating mean and standard deviation
gives a mean of approximately 31,710.96 and a standard deviation of approximately
32,743.20. Based on these values it would appear that this sequence of IPIDs is
centered close to 32,743 and has a large degree of variance between IPID values.
However, this is not the case. When the “wrap-around” is accounted for it can be
clearly seen that this sequence of IPIDs is centered around the “wrap-around” point
and that the values are spaced very close together, since the difference between each
value and the next is one.
A more accurate representation of IPIDs is that of a sequence of data values
contained in a circular space, like directions on a compass face or the minutes of an
analog clock, rather than a linear one. By treating an IPID value not as a point
on a line but as the angle from 0 to a point on a unit circle, I can more accurately
calculate statistics about IPID sequences while accounting for “wrap-arounds” and
more sparse IPID sequences. Treating the above sequence of IPIDs as this type of
circular data and computing the circular mean and standard deviation gives values
of approximately 0.0 and 8.95, which more accurately describes the behavior of the
sequence.
Representing IPIDs as circular data I derived two sets of features to use in my
hierarchical clustering: circular standard deviation and circular correlation. Circular
standard deviation provides a measure of how sparsely clustered IPIDs are. IPID
behavior which uses constant values will have no spread, global and per-host behaviors will likely have some spread but not much, and random IPIDs will exhibit a
large amount of spread. Circular correlation will allow me to better determine how
correlated behavior is both between and within each individual test. This will allow
me to better determine differences between random behavior, predictable IPID behavior such as global IPID counters, and IPID behavior that uses different per-host
or per-protocol counters.
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5.3.3

Hierarchical Clustering

The features described above and in Table 5.1 give me a set of 16 features for each
IPv4 address that responded to my tests. To better study the variety of behavioral
classes present in my data I used agglomerative hierarchical clustering using the
UPGMA linkage method to study the data. Agglomerative hierarchical clustering is
a method of clustering data based on the distance between clusters. Starting from
a set of all individual data points as singleton clusters, agglomerative hierarchical
clustering then iteratively merges the closest two clusters at each step to build a
hierarchy of clusters built from nearest to furthest apart. To determine the distance
metric between my data points I chose to use the cosine similarity distance as my
distance metric. I chose this metric because it provided a way for me to compare my
data points based on how similar their behaviors are, based on their features.
Due to resource and computational limitations I was not able to cluster my
complete data set at once. As a result, I chose to cluster a random sample of
100,000 unique IPv4 addresses to determine an overall set of unique clusters within
my data. Once I built this set of clusters I used a similarity search process between
these clustered data points and the remaining, unclustered data points. This process
calculates a similarity value between each unclustered data point and all of the
clustered data points. Unclustered data points are then assigned to the cluster
containing the most similar clustered data point.

5.4

Results

In this section I discuss the results of my analysis of the collected IPID behavior data.
This includes discussion of the chosen “cut points” used to derive clusters during
hierarchical clustering, an overview of the results of my hierarchical clustering on a
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Figure 5.1: Dendrogram of clusters from a random sample of 100,000 datapoints.

random sample of 100,000 data points, and an overview of the analysis of the full
data set using a similarity search process to assign data points to known clusters.

5.4.1

Choosing a Cut-Point

Hierarchical clustering builds a hierarchy of clusters, beginning with one single cluster
at the highest-level and branching until each individual datapoint forms a singleton
cluster at the lowest-level. A common practice when analyzing the clusters formed
via hierarchical clustering is to choose a “cut-point” at a chosen distance threshold or
number of clusters. Once this cut-point is chosen, any clusters formed by branching
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Behavior

Description

Random
Random with Incremental
Random with Firewall
Per-Host
Per-Protocol
Unpatched Linux
Global IPID
Global IPID with Firewall
Constant
Patched Linux
Multiple Counter with Firewall

IPIDs appear to be generated at random
Random TCP and incremental ICMP IPIDs
Random TCP and constant ICMP IPIDs
Unique counters for each unique IPv4 address
Unique counters for each protocol
Linux kernels before v5.19
A single, global IPID counter
Global TCP counter and constant ICMP IPID
A single, constant IPID value
Linux kernels after v5.19
Mixed TCP behavior and constant ICMP IPID

Table 5.2: Unique behaviors found via clustering.

below this point are considered part of a single cluster. Based on empirical and
manual analysis of a variety of cut-points I ultimately chose to use a cut-point of
26 clusters. Based on my manual analysis of the clusters created, I felt this cutpoint provided the best set of unique IPID generation clusters without unnecessarily
dividing clusters that represented larger, more common IPID generation methods.
Within my data, IPID behaviors were found that contain erratic behavior that is
neither random nor consistent with previously documented behaviors. Often these
behaviors form small clusters containing only a handful of datapoints. Due to the
small size of clusters and their lack of similarity with any other clusters I chose
to treat these small clusters as outliers, rather than unique behaviors. Based on
empirical analysis of the 26 clusters created using the above discussed cut-point I
chose a minimum threshold of 100 items for my clusters. Any clusters containing
less than 100 datapoints were considered to contain outliers. Ultimately my analysis
found 11 clusters of unique, non-outlier, IPID behavior. These behaviors are listed
in Table 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Scatter plot of clusters found on random sample of 100,000 datapoints.

5.4.2

Clustering Results for Random Sample

Table 5.3 shows the results of my clustering on a random, sample of 100,000 data
points that responded to my scan. Overall, Linux machines make up the majority
of these 100,000 datapoints. Determining the identity of the operating systems in
use by non-Linux machines is more difficult due to the lack of additional information
provided by an IPID scan alone. Linux is unique, in the sense that it uses an IPID
generation scheme, discussed in Chapter 4, that has a unique set of IPID behaviors.
Operating systems which use Global IPIDs or Random IPIDs are difficult to uniquely
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Behavior
Random
Random with Incremental
Random with Firewall
Per-Host
Per-Protocol
Unpatched Linux
Global IPID
Global IPID with Firewall
Constant
Patched Linux
Multiple Counter with Firewall
Outliers
Total

Number

Percent of Total

386
299
6,604
5,181
1,366
17,749
11,923
3,474
108
52,344
338
228

0.39%
0.30%
6.60%
5.18%
1.37%
17.75 %
11.92%
3.48%
0.10%
52.34%
0.34%
0.23%

100,000

100.0%

Table 5.3: Clusters derived from a random sample of 100,000 datapoints.

identify based on IPID values alone. Figure 5.2 shows a projection of these 100,000
datapoints onto a two dimensional space, to provide a visual representation of the
clusters I found during my analysis.

5.4.3

Cluster Analysis of Full Dataset

Table 5.4 shows the clustering results of the similarity search process applied to my
full dataset. Compared with the results of my analysis of a random sample of 100,000
datapoints, shown in Table 5.3 the results for the full dataset are very similar. The
overall distribution of datapoints between clusters, measured as the percent of my
dataset contained within each cluster, remains relatively unchanged.
Overall Linux machines make up a majority of the IPv4 addresses in my dataset,
5,938,448 (70%) addresses in total. My scan was run approximately six months after
the side-channel vulnerability I discussed in Chapter 4 was disclosed and patched,
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Behavior

Number

Percent of Total

Random
34,521
Random with Incremental
25,348
Random with Firewall
548,033
Per-Host
447,351
Per-Protocol
118,266
Unpatched Linux
1,509,941
Global IPID
1,012,838
Global IPID with Firewall
304,713
Constant
8,848
Patched Linux
4,428,457
Multiple Counter with Firewall
27,889
Outliers
17,716

0.41%
0.30%
6.46%
5.27%
1.39%
17.80%
11.94%
3.59%
0.10%
52.20%
0.33%
0.21%

Total

100.0%

8,483,921

Table 5.4: Clusters derived from similarity search process.

however my analysis shows that close to 25% of all Linux machines in my dataset
had not been patched over that timespan, a not insignificant number.
Focusing on non-Linux machines, I find that machines using some form of Global
IPID counter to generate IPID values make up close to 16% of my dataset. Machines
using random IPID values make up approximately 7% of my dataset, an increase in
the amount found by related work [70].
One interesting behavior that I found in my analysis was the number of machines
using constant values for ICMP packets but not for TCP packets. These are the
machines that I have classified as behaviors “with Firewall”. The generation of TCP
packet IPID values for these machines covers a range of behaviors (e.g., Random
IPIDs or Global IPIDs) but all of these machines use a constant value for their
ICMP packet IPIDs. The most common value I saw was 1 but other values existed
within my dataset as well. The machines “with Firewall” make up 10.38% of the
addresses in my dataset, a not insignificant portion.
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5.5

Discussion

In this section I present interesting behaviors I uncovered by the hierarchical clustering I carried out, compare the relative prevalence between common behaviors,
and discuss interesting network and routing behaviors that impact IPID-based sidechannels.

5.5.1

Machines Vulnerable to known IPID Side-Channels

One of the main goals of the work discussed in the Chapter, was to scan the entire
IPv4 address space to gain a better understanding of the different IPID behaviors
present on the Internet as a whole and to better understand how many machines may
be using behaviors that are vulnerable to known IPID-based side-channels. One
such side-channel is the vulnerability discussed in Chapter 4. The side-channel I
described was present in the Linux kernel but was patched following my disclosure of
the vulnerability. However, as discussed previously over 25% of the Linux machines
in my dataset were running versions of the Linux kernel that had not been patched
to mitigate the vulnerability I disclosed.
Prior work [6, 9, 16, 28, 47, 58] discussed IPID-based side-channels that relied on
Global IPID values to function. As operating systems have transitioned away from
the use of Global IPID values the number of machines these side-channels exist in
has decreased but there still exists a sizeable portion of machines in my dataset that
use Global IPID values. As discussed in Chapter 5.4.3 close to 16% of my dataset,
1,317,818 IPv4 addresses in total, appeared to be using a global IPID counter to
generate IPID values. These machines are likely to contain IPID-based side-channels
that would allow them to be used in the techniques mentioned above.
Based on the set of IPID-based side-channels I am aware of, and those I have
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discussed in this dissertation, I can make an estimate of the number of machines
in my dataset which are containing exploitable side-channels. Combining the set of
machines which appear to be using Global IPIDs and those Linux machines running kernel versions that were not patched to mitigate the vulnerability discussed
in Chapter 4 I find that 2,827,759 (33.33%) addresses in my dataset are likely to
contain an known, IPID-based side-channel. While this number is likely to decrease,
as the Linux machines running kernels that had not been patched to mitigate the
side-channel vulnerability discussed in Chapter 4 are patched, this still constitutes a
large number of active machines on the Internet.

5.5.2

Comparison with Prior IPID Studies

Comparing my study with prior studies shows a continuing evolution of IPID generation methods on the Internet. The most recent studies of IPID generation methods
are by Salutari et al. [70] and Pearce et al. [62]. Salutari et al. found that 18% of
addresses used Global IPIDs, while Pearce et al. found that 16% of addresses used
Global IPIDs. These results are inline with my own finding that approximately 16%
of addresses in my dataset use Global IPIDs. This fits with an evolution of IPIDs
away from Global IPID counters, likely due to changes in operating systems such
as Linux. Earlier studies showed a much larger prevalence of Global IPIDs. A 2003
study by Mahajan et al. [55] found that 70% of addresses used Global IPIDs. In
2005, Chen et al. [16] placed the percentage of addresses using Global IPIDs at 38%.
Gilad and Herzberg [35] found 57% of Top Level Domain TLDs used Global IPIDs,
in 2011.
The largest area where my results differ from prior work is in the prevalence,
or lack of, addresses using a constant IPID value. Salutari et al. [70] found that
34% of addresses they scanned, responded with a constant IPID value. Gilad and
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Herzberg [35] found that 9% of addresses they scanned used a constant IPID value.
My own results find that less than 1% of addresses, in my dataset, respond with
a constant IPID value. The two most likely causes of this difference are continued
operating system change and the presence of ICMP filter or traffic manipulation devices. As operating systems continue to change and improve, systems using constant
counters are likely to either be phased out of usage or change to another system of
IPID generation. This continued change could be the cause of the difference between
the results found by Gilad and Herzberg (i.e., that 9% of addresses used a constant
IPID value) and my own findings (i.e., that less than 1% of addresses use a constant
IPID value). A likely reason for the large difference between my own findings and
those of Salutari et al. is the presence of large numbers of machines in my dataset
that appear to filter or change ICMP traffic to use a constant IPID value but use
another IPID generation method for TCP traffic. As I discussed in Section 5.4.3,
these addresses make up 10% of the addresses in my full dataset. While this does not
fully account for the 34% of machines seen using a constant IPID value by Salutari
et al. it does account for a large portion of the difference. Other differences in choice
of addresses to scan, scanning methodology, or unforeseen network changes may help
explain the remaining difference.
Another area where my results show continued evolution of IPID generation
methods is the increase in the prevalence of random IPID values in my dataset,
compared to prior work. Random IPID generation methods are unlikely to contain
side-channels, assuming the generation method is sufficiently random, as a series of
random values provides an off-path machine with no source of usable information.
Gilad and Herzberg [35] found only 1% of address they scanned were using random
IPID values. The most recent study, by Salutari et al. [70] found that 2% of address
they scanned used random IPIDs. My own results show that approximately 7% of
the addresses in my dataset use random IPID values, a noticeable increase. One
possible explanation for the difference between my results and those of Salutari et al.
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is that Salutari et al. limited their scan to ICMP packets only. As discussed above
one large-scale behavior I noticed was the prevalence of addresses which used some
kind of traffic filtering or manipulation mechanism for ICMP traffic. This resulted in
a large number of addresses, 880,903 in total, using a constant IPID value for ICMP
traffic but another IPID generation method for TCP. Salutari et al. would have
classified any of these addresses as using a constant IPID value, due to their focus
on ICMP traffic only. My study shows that addresses using random IPID values to
be a much larger portion of the IPv4 addresses space.

5.6

Ethical Considerations

In order to avoid potentially exhausting resources on the machines I scanned I strove
to follow established best practices. All TCP packets that I sent do not attempt to
create a TCP connection and should all be immediately RST. This helps to ensure
that my scan did not cause a denial-of-service (DoS) attack. ICMP packets were
never sent in amounts greater than thirty-two per test to ensure that any resources
used to respond to them or store ICMP fragments were kept to a minimum. In
addition I maintained a blacklist of IP addresses and IP networks that were to never
be scanned, based on opt-out requests from previous studies. Via reverse DNS all
my measurement IP addresses pointed to a website which explained what my scans
were and provided contact information to allow network operators to opt-out of any
further scans of their IP addresses or IP networks. Emails pertaining to my scans
sent to the university’s network security and abuse team were also forwarded to me
so I could remove those IPs who wished to not be scanned. I received five complaints
asking that IP addresses or networks be added to my blacklist and each was added
as soon as I received the email.
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5.7

Conclusion

In this chapter I have presented the results of an IPv4 address space scan of IPID
value generation and the prevalence of known IPID side-channels. I analyzed my
scan data using hierarchical clustering to study the different types of IPID generation
methods used to respond to my scan and the relative prevalence of each behavior in
my dataset. Overall, I find 11 unique IPID behaviors in my dataset.
My scan differs from previous studies of IPID behavior in that it studies not only
IPID differences per-host but also differences in IPID generation per-protocol. This
is important because some operating systems (i.e., Linux) are known to consider
both the source address and protocol when generating IPID values for outgoing
packets. Whereas previous work showed a higher than expected rate of machines
using constant IPID values, 34% of addresses, my results show that the number
of machines using constant IPID values is much lower, less than 1% of addresses.
This can be explained by the prevalence of firewalls or other networking devices
which filter traffic differently, based on the protocol being used. In the case of my
data, this takes the form of IP addresses responding with constant IPID values for
ICMP traffic but using non-constant values for other protocols, such as TCP. By
considering both per-host variations and per-protocol variations researchers studying
IPID side-channels can gain a much clearer picture of which machines are likely to
contain side-channels on the Internet.
Based on my analysis, I find that close to 35% of the IP addresses in my dataset
use IPID generation methods that are likely to contain IPID side-channels. These
include side-channels which allow for known attacks, such as the attack discussed
in Chapter 4, or known network measurement techniques that rely on IPID sidechannels, such as IPID-based Idle Scans. While this number is likely to decrease, as
machines which had not been patched to mitigate the attack discussed in Chapter 4,
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this would still leave close to 17% of the addresses in my dataset using IPID generation methods that are likely to contain known IPID side-channels. This is similar
to previous best estimates of 16-18% IPv4 machines using IPID generation methods containing side-channels but shows that there still exist a significant number of
machines across the IPv4 address space likely to contain IPID-based side-channels.
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 I discussed techniques for using network side-channels
that do not fully exhaust the shared, finite resources used to access an information
side-channel. Both of these techniques targeted the Linux kernel’s TCP networking
stack. Due to the unique method the Linux kernel uses to generate IPID values I
can provide an estimate of the number of machines that each technique could target.
For the attack discussed in Chapter 4 this is approximately 18% of the IP addresses
contained in my dataset. The round-trip-time measurement technique I discussed
in Chapter 3 uses a side-channel in the Linux kernel’s SYN-backlog. Based on my
analysis, 70% of the IP addresses in my dataset are likely candidates for use with
this technique. This represents a lower bound on the total number of addresses, as
it is possible some of the addresses in my dataset using Global IPID values could
be older versions of Linux which have the required SYN-backlog behavior but are
not recent enough to use the IPID behavior discussed in Chapter 4. This shows
that non-exhaustive side-channel techniques can be used against a large number of
IP addresses and provide the first IPv4-scale analysis of the extent to which the
technique discussed in Chapter 4 might be usable.
I have discussed an IPv4 address space “mass-scan” of IPID generation across
differences in both changes to the source IP address and IP packet protocol. I
analyzed the results of this scan using hierarchical clustering to study both the total
number of common generation methods and their relative prevalence. I have shown
that scans which use only a single IP protocol or IP address can provide an incomplete
picture of IPID generation methods “in the wild”. Finally, I have discussed how my
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results provide a lower bound on the prevalence of known, non-exhaustive IPID sidechannels and provided an estimate of the number of IP addresses which could be
used for the non-exhaustive, side-channel technique discussed in Chapter 4.

94

Chapter 6
Future Work
This dissertation presented research that builds the premise that: Network sidechannels can be used to measure machine and connection state beyond connectivity
without fully exhausting shared resources. There exist a number of different directions in which future research into this area could be taken. One possible area is to
measure lower level connection features beyond round trip time. Features such as
number of routing hops between off-path machines, detecting the presence of loadbalancers, and counting load balancers would all be of interest to researchers trying
to get a better understanding of network topology. As an example consider a hypothetical side-channel that allows researchers to count changes to the time-to-live
(TTL) field in IPv4 packet headers. Using this side-channel researchers could easily
determine how many machines were involved in routing a given packet. Whether
such side-channels exist and can be used to carry out off-path measurement without
fully exhausting shared resources is an area that has seen limited research and could
provide a wealth of possible techniques.
The research in this dissertation studied side-channels in IPv4 and TCP. Both of
these protocols exist in the lower levels of the OSI model of computer networks [85],
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Layers 3 and 4. Are there side-channels present in higher layer protocols (e.g., HTTP,
SMTP, DNS, or DHCP)? And could such side-channels be leveraged to carry out
off-path measurements or attacks? These are both open questions that have seen
comparatively less research than side-channels in lower level protocols like IPv4 and
TCP. There has been limited prior work that targets these higher level protocols.
Instead, the side-channels used are often in the lower level protocols the higher level
protocols exists on top of.
Many network side-channels are likely to be unique to specific operating systems
or even specific operating system versions. As discussed in Chapter 4, the Linux
kernel’s network stack has used three different versions of IPID generation code during its lifetime. Each of these different versions contained documented side-channels.
One avenue for future work is to use the side-channels discussed in this dissertation
and in other research as a method of performing off-path operating system fingerprinting. As an example, the Linux kernel and the Microsoft Windows operating
system likely both contain network side-channels however each will contain different
side-channels. The differences in which side-channels can be used could help to identify the operating system of a remote host using only off-path packets. In addition
such tests could be added into existing tools, such as nmap’s OS fingerprinting feature, to help augment its accuracy or better distinguish between hosts with similar
behaviors. The development of such techniques could allow researchers to perform
OS fingerprinting of machines that are behind firewalls or only respond to a limited
set of packets, making traditional direct OS fingerprinting difficult or impossible.
Another area for future work that follows from the mass-scan carried out in
Chapter 5 is to study other packet fields across the entire Internet. Fields such as
TCP sequence and acknowledgement number generation, TCP ephemeral ports, and
ICMP ping sequence and id numbers could all contain side-channels if not generated
in a sufficiently robust manner. In addition, to my knowledge there has not been an
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Internet wide study of SYN-backlog behavior or IPv4 fragmentation cache behavior.
As discussed in Chapter 3 and by Knockel and Crandall [45] both of these structures
are often implemented as a shared buffer that can be used as side-channels. An
Internet scale study of the different behaviors within these structures could point
to other side-channels within previously unstudied network stacks. One difficulty
in carrying out such a study is that side-channels within these shared buffers often
require the buffer be completely filled or exhausted. Finding a technique that can
study their behavior without fully exhausting these shared resources would be needed
to ensure any such study did not cause a denial-of-service attack on any scanned
machines.
One area that has received less research is the presence of side-channels in the
IPv6 networking stack of operating systems. All of the work in this dissertation
focused on the IPv4 networking stack. However, as IPv6 adoption continues to increase more machines will be communicating using IPv6. Since IPv6 has not been
studied as much as IPv4 are there may side-channels within various IPv6 implementations that are not present in IPv4? Is there any overlap between side-channels
present in IPv4 and IPv6? ONIS [83] and Morbitzer’s work [58] showed that the
Linux kernel’s IPv6 IPID implementation shared similar side-channels as its IPv4
implementation. Are there other such “dual-stack” side-channels that can be used
to measure complex state, such as detecting TCP connections? Further study into
both IPv6 side-channels and the overlap between side-channels in IPv4 and IPv6
could help to answer these questions.
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Conclusion
Network side-channels are information flows within shared, finite resources in the
networking stack of computer operating systems. These resources often take the
form of shared, global counters, global packet rate-limits, or memory buffers used to
populate packet header fields or queue incoming packets for later processing. Prior
work studying network side-channels often relied on completely exhausting these
resources in order to gain information on the state of remote or off-path machines.
In this dissertation I have discussed techniques which depart from this method of
exhausting side-channel resources and instead extract information about the state of
remote, off-path machines without fully exhausting shared, finite resources.
At the start of this dissertation I introduced the thesis statement that underlies
my dissertation research: Network side-channels can be used to measure machine
and network state beyond connectivity without fully exhausting the shared, finite
resources that create them. In Chapter 3 I detailed my research into the use of a
side-channel in the Linux kernel’s SYN-backlog to measure off-path round trip time
(RTT). This work supports my thesis statement by providing a method to measure
round trip time, a network property independent of connectivity, without fully filling,
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and thereby exhausting, the shared memory buffer used to implement the kernel’s
SYN-backlog. This technique is completely off-path (i.e., it can measure round trip
time between two remote hosts without having access to either host or the traffic
sent between them), has accuracy comparable to other techniques that require the
use of additional machines beyond those whose RTT is being measured, and does so
without fully exhausting all available space in the SYN-backlog.
Chapter 4 discussed my work using a side-channel present in the Linux kernel’s
handling of IPID counters to detect the presence of active TCP connections between
two remote off-path machines. This work takes advantage of the Linux kernel’s
IPID implementation which uses one of two different IPID counters for TCP traffic.
One shared counter used for TCP packets that are not part of established TCP
connections and another, per-connection, counter used when a connection has been
established. Using IPID changes to determine which counter is being used, an offpath attacker can check possible TCP/IP 4-tuples (i.e., source and destination IPv4
addresses and source and destination TCP ports) and detect the presence of an
active TCP connection. This work supports my thesis statement by demonstrating a
technique to measure machine state beyond connectivity, namely the presence of an
established TCP connection, and does so without exhausting a shared memory buffer
or global rate-limit as done by related work. In addition this work is the first that
I am aware of to detail the presence and usage of a side-channel in a network stack
that makes use of “hybrid” counters or shared resources. That is a system that uses
a mix of global, shared resources and individual, per-connection or per-destination
resources depending on system networking state.
I discussed an Internet scale “mass scan” which studied IPv4 Identification field
value generation and uniqueness across different destination hosts and protocols in
Chapter 5. This work helps to support my thesis statement by providing an Internet
scale study of IPID value generation and uniqueness, with a focus on detecting the
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presence of likely side-channels that could be used without fully exhausting shared
resources on remote machines. This work focuses on attempting to measure the
dependence between the IPID values sequentially sent to separate IPv4 address and
IPv4 next level protocols. When such a dependence exists it points to the possible
presence of a side-channel because the dependence allows an off-path machine to
determine whether or not off-path traffic caused a change in a given IPID. This is
due to the dependence between the two IPID values causing one to change based
on the value of the other. This dependence allows an off-path machine to extract
information about whether or not off-path traffic occurred without fully exhausting
network resources by using the IPID dependence to predict what IPIDs would be in
cases where traffic is and is not sent. Based on which of these cases the measured
IPIDs best match an off-path machine can determine which case occurred and use
the IPID field as a side-channel.
In this dissertation, I have discussed three different directions of research which
studied the use of network side-channels to carry out off-path network measurements. My work includes techniques for measuring non-trivial network state and
attacks without requiring the complete exhaustion of the shared, finite resources
that give rise to these side-channels. This illuminates new directions that network
side-channel research can be taken and highlights that using network side-channels
does not require fully exhausting a shared, finite resource.
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